Ireland: an old doctrine of insurance law revisited by Kilcommins, Shane
Ireland: An Old Doctrine of Insurance 
Law Revisited 
By Shane Kilcommins' 
At the invitation of the British Insurance Law Association Trust, Sir 
Andrew Longmore delivered the first Pat Saxton Memorial Lecture Oil 
March 5, 2001. His lecture was entitled "An Insurance Contr,lCts Act {I.)!' 
a New Century". In the lecture Sir Andrew suggested that the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906, in England and Wales was a "brilliant synthesis of a 
f· I 1" " I I I "N maze o· common aw (eCISlons. .. e went on to note: ow, a century 
later, it is operating as too tight a straitjacket. The best way of celebrating 
Sir Mackenzie Chalmers considerable achievement would he to have an 
Ins\lrance Contracts Act of say 2002 or even, if necessary, 2{)06 to mark 
the centenary of the 1906 Act so that it might be possible to enact 
sensible reform f(n insurance law as a whole."2 As regards the content of 
such legislation, Sir Andrew noled thaI Ihere was an argument "for 
codification of insurance law in general", but believed it would be an 
"enormous task and invite yet further delay".3 Instead, he opined that i( 
should be piecemeal in nature, beginning with the elusive doctrine of 
IIberrillUle fides. No doubt, the ghost of Jeremy Bentham, still flying the 
expositorial flag and ridiculing "dog law", would, at least partially, be 
pleased by Stich sentiments, but they may prove 10 be irksome to many 
olhers. 4 
Lecturer in Law, University College Cork. 
Longmore, Sir A. An illSurance contracts act {oJ' a new century. !.loyd's Al(/ririlllc 
alld COII/II/erciai Law Quarrerly, ParI 3 (2001), pp. 356-368 al 357. 
2 Thid. 
3 Tbid at 3M. 
4 See thhlo, II.R. Here lies the Common Law: Rest in peace. ModeI'll Law Uel'iClv, 
30(3) (1967): 241-259; Lord Goff of Chieveley, Corning together ~- the future, in 
B.S. Markesinis (ed.). "The Clifford Chance Millcnililn Lectures: The Coming 




The focus of this article is not so much concerned with the relative 
merits and demerits of Sir Andrew's comments as they apply to England 
and Wales. Rather, it will expatiate on Ireland's experience of the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906, and whether or not further legislative reform, of a 
sweeping or piecemeal nature, is a necessary requirement in that 
jurisdiction. In keeping with Sir Andrew's desire to reform the duty of 
disclosure, this paper wiII also focus on the same duty, but from an lrish 
vista and only from the perspective of what need not be disclosed.s To be 
more specific, the article will dwell on three aspects of this perspective: 
facts which an assured does not know, previous criminal information, 
and facts known to an insurer. 6 It will be argued that there hilS been Ii ttle 
or no sustained analysis of this area of law in Ireland. This is attributable, 
in part, to the lack of case-law arising in the Courts. What case law does 
exist however often raises more questions than it answers and significant 
lacunae remain in evidence. To this end, it will he submitted that the 
Marine Inslirance Act, 1906, or the case law arising therefrom, is 
operating, in the absence of more protracted scrutiny, as too loose a 
strai tjacket. 
Two final points can be made before commencing the article. First, it is 
often said that the greater the extent of the case-law on a particular 
statute, the less effective the statute. For Ireland, at least, as regards the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, the converse, it is submitted, is true. Such an 
observation, however, cannot be employed as evidence of the need for 
sweeping or piecemeal Iegislat ive reform.7 I ndeed, as regards the call for 
statutory reform of the duty of disclosure, it will be argued that in 
seeking to avnid the current uncertainty of Charybdis, one must be 
careful not to ltlllnder on the legislative rock of Scylla: any attempt to 
:=; For a general analysis of the duty of disclosure in Irish insllrance law, including 
the decisive iJilluence, prJldent insurer test of llIateri,dity, the absellce of a 
requilTlllcnt of aciu,d inducemcnt, and the emergence of oIle judicial 
pronounccment, albeit obiter, to the erfect tilal a reasonable assured lesl may 
reptlce the prudent insurer test in circlImstances where the particular 
underwriter is acting unreasonably, see Kilc0l1ll1lins, S. and l.ind, C. lVlaking 
scnse of the (,ISl'S on materiality and the dut), of disclosure in Irish insurance 
I,lli'. Till' lllkrtlcltioll<ll }ollnuIi of llllllrel1lec Low PM\ 4, (ILJLJK): 263--27K. 
6 ()n waiver in Irish insuranl'e lall', see Kiicoll1mins, S. and l.ind, C. ibid at 
1'1" 27.1 -276. 
7 St.ttutnry microsurgery, though, \\lay be very appropriak in Irdand as reg'lrd, 
thl' duty of adults \0 disclose previolls criminal ini(JrInatioJl. 
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statutorily reform the duty of disclosure will, f(Jr example, encounter the 
difficulties of producing definitive propositions, and they are numerable 
in snch a broad area of law; the questionable will of Parliament to do so; 
the position of the powerful insurance lobby as regards snch reform; and, 
the length of time required before any reform is actually promulgated in 
law (it took 12 years in the case of the Marine Insllrance Act, 19(6).8 
Other vehicles of ref or Ill, it will be submitted, need to be considered such 
as model laws and non-binding codes which would be informative in 
nature and could be employed to scrutinize all aspects of lIlierrillllle fides 
contracts including the broad range of lacunae that are currently 
palpable. Secondly, it would be unfair to build a "straw Illan" of Sir 
Longmore's arguments, so as the more easily to knock him over. His 
claims were made Oilly in respect of the British market and were l10t 
intended for the ears of the Irish legislature. Nonetheless, given that the 
same enactment applies to both jurisdictions, it is interesting, from a 
comparative perspective, to examine the merits of legislative reiiHll1 from 
an Irish viewpoint, albeit a narrow viewpoint in that it only focuses on 
particular types of facts that need not be disclosed. This article, then, will 
commence with an examinatioJl of !;lcts, within the kJlowledge of all 
assured, which must he disclosed in Ireland, how basis of contract clauses 
may affect such knowledge, the inferences that can he drawn from the 
primary knowledge of an assured, what knowledge an assured can be 
"deemed" to know, the significance of an agent'~ knowledge as regards 
the duty, and the ramifications of the Irish Insurance Codes of Practice, 
1992, and the European Communities (Un(.lir Terms in Consumer 
Contracts) Regulations, 1995. 
FACTS WHICH YOU DO NOT KNOW 
Section IS(l) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 provides that an 
assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, 
material circumstances which are known to him or her. Of course, the 
law does not excuse the non-disclosure of information which the assured 
1\ See Cretncy S. The politics of law reform - A view from the inside. Modem Imv 
Review, 41l(S) (19IlS): 493-517. 
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has hut has no reason to think relevant -- what is material is that which 
would decisively influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in 
determining whether or not to take the risk and at what premium.') 
Accordingly, in determining materiality, the assureds' opinion as to what 
they would pluck from the ambit of their knowledge is not relevant. 10 
Moreover, the law does not excuse innocent mistake or forgetfulness. I I 
In respect of the laller, Clarke noted: "[ TJ he proposer may well be 
surprised by what the law expects of the human memory. The 
iniiJrmation that the proposer must disclose includes not only 
information actually in mind when contracting or information which, 
if prompted, the proposer would recall, but also informat ion which the 
proposer once knew but has completely forgotten or which the proposer 
never actually knew at all but which was known to the proposer's agents. 
No allowance is made for age or forgetfulness: the person with a bad 
. I I I I I ..» iJ memory IS expecte( to lave a goO( notepa( or a goO( orgal1lZatlOn. -
The issue of the knowledge of an assured has been considered in 
England and Wales. In Ilcarts of Oak Hllilding Society v. l,{/w Ullion (///(/ 
Uock IIlSllrilllCe Co. Utl,l.! for example, the case concerned an application 
fill' a policy of fidelity guarantee to be issued by the respondent in respect 
of a solicitor employed by the claimant to receive mortgage moneys. In 
') III Irelalld, see Chariot 1IlIIS Uti 1'. A"icllrtlziolli SPA ilml Coyle I III/II iii/oil 
lIo/llil/oll Philip, Ltd [ IlJH II I.It 225 at 226. III Ellgbnd and Wales, the teot of 
materiality is that which a prudent insurer, if he or she had known the l'lcl in 
question, would have taken into account when reaching his or her decisioJl to 
accept the risk or what premium to clwrge. There is also a second limb to this 
test in that be/ine a particular uJlderwriter call avoid a contract lin non-
disclosure of a Illatrrial l'lct, it nlllSt he shown th,lt he or she was actually 
induced by the 11l>n-disclosurc to enter into the policy on the relevant terms. See 
1',/11 A/ltlll/ic 11lS1I/Wlce Co. /.ttl I'. Pille Top IllSllUlIlCt' Co. Ltd [1l)lJ4j 3 WLI~ 677; 
S/ Ptilil Firt' tllld A/tlrille 11I:;II/WICe Co. 1'. A1cColille/l [lo\Vell COIIS/rilc/ioll Ltd 
[1<)lJ5j 2 l.loyd's I(ep I 16. 
10 SCt', lin example, the jlldgment of Bayley J. in Lilltlellllll 1'. [)es/Jol"OligiI (IH2H) H 
II & C 5H6, at 5lJ2. 
II Srt', lill" example, the judgmCIlt of Cockburn c.J. in Hil/es 1'. l/ewitl where it was 
nolL'd: "It is well established lalV that it is iI1lmaterial whether the oI1lission to 
u)I1Imunicatr a Inatni.d Llct arises from iIldifference or a mistake or from it not 
being present to the mind of the assured that the I'lct was one which it was 
m,ltni.tI to make kIWIVIL" (IH67) 1..lt 2 (2J\. 5lJ5 at 607_ 
12 (·l.lrke, 1\'1. "['olilies and I'crcrptiol1S of Insurance," Clarendon Press, (lxlill'd, 
1')<)7: /,_ H7. 
Ll [llJ3bj 2 All F.IL hllJ. 
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response to certain questions posed by the respondents, the claimant 
stated that the solicitor was required to send daily statements of cash 
received and to pay over such cash to the claimants as soon as it was 
received. Before the policy was renewed, the claimant discovered that the 
solicitor was not actually handing over the money as soon as it was 
received. This fact was not communicated to the respondent and the 
policy was duly renewed. The claimant suffered a loss of £6,731 7s. 6d. 
through the defaults of the solicitor and claimed indemnity under the 
policy. The respondents denied liability on the grounds inler alia that the 
answers to the questions in the application form were warranties as a 
result of a basis of contract clause which had been signed by the 
claimants. In holding for the claimant on the basis that the questions 
were merely statements of facts as to the dllties of the solicitor and were 
not warranties that sllch duties would be strictly pelj(ml/cd, Goddard J. 
noted that the claimant could not know whether the solicitor did actually 
receive money on a particular day.l~ Indeed it was because the claimants 
did not know when the solicitor received money, and whether or not he 
would hand over the exact sums received, that they wished to insure 
against his pO$"jble defalcations - if they could have been certain that he 
would have handed over all moneys received, there would have been 
nothing to insure against. Accordingly, the claimants only had to disclose 
what they knew. Because the claimants did not know, at the inception of 
the policy,I5 that in some instances the solicitor would not hand over 
money with the promptitude with which it was his duty to act, the policy 
could not be avoided. In interpreting the contractual nat me of the policy 
alld what the parties agreed, it was held that the claimants had only 
14 [iJid at 623. 
15 As noted, there was evidence to suggest that the claimants knew prior to renewal 
that the solicitor was not perJi>rIlling his duties as he should have been, though 
they did not suspect fraud. It was never, however, pleaded on behalf of the 
respondent that there was non-disclosure of a material hlct at renewal. Rather it 
was argued that as the solicitor had not carried out his duties, the answers to the 
questions posed in the original policy - which became warranties as a result of a 
basis of contract clause - were false. It Illay have been more cogent, however, to 
pursue a line of reasoning which focused on the colllmon law dut y of disclosure 
at renewal rather than on the contractual nuances of the original policy. In 
other words, it should have been argued that as the claimants were aware that 
their solicitor was engaging in a dereliction of duties prior to renewal, this was a 




warranted the truth about the duties of the solicitor (of which they had 
knowledge), not that such duties would be strictly discharged (of which 
they had no knowledge). 
I n Joel v. Law Ullioll ami Crowll Insurallce Co I1IpllI ly, 16 a case 
concerning both warranties and the common law duty of disclosure, the 
assured, an applicant i(n life assurance, in response to questions posed by 
the insurer's doctor, answered that she had never suffered from mental 
derangement- in fact, though not aware of it, the assured had been in 
confinement for acute mania. She signed a declaration to the effect that 
the answers to the questions posed by the insurance company's doctor 
were all true. The assured subsequently committed suicide and the 
executrix of her estate sought to claim under the life policy. The 
defendant insurers sought to resist the claims on two grounds: (a) that 
the accuracy of the answers to the questions were a condition precedent 
to the validity of the policy, and; (b) that there was non-disclosure of a 
material t~ICt. In finding f(lf the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal held that 
the questiollS posed by the doctor to the assured were not expressly made 
the basis of the contract and, therefore, were questions to be answered to 
the best knowledge and belief of the assured, but not questions which the 
assured would warrant the truth of. I\s the contract contained no express 
stipulation to the effect that representations made outside the proposal 
form assumed the status of conditions precedent to validity, it was not 
open to the insurers to argue that incorrect answers given to their doctor 
enabled them to repudiate liability regardless of causative effect. But the 
hid that the assured warranted the truth of her answers in the proposal 
form only did not mean that she was excused the duty to make full 
disclosure of all facts material to the risk when she was afterwards 
questioned by the insurer's doctor. Although only the answers to 
questions in the proposal form were made the basis of the contract as a 
result of judicial interpretation of the contract, answers to questions 
posed outside the proposal fimn were representations which mayor may 
not have been material depending on causative effect. In the particular 
circumstances of the L'ase, it was held, given that the facts to be disclosed 
must be matters within the knowledge of the applicant, that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that there had been a non-disclosure which 
III II <)OH I 2 K,II, H(l.1 . 
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would have rendered the policy voidable. I n respect of knowledge and 
non-disclosure, Fletcher Moulton, L.J. noted the following: 
The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do 
not know. The obligation to disclose, therefore, necessarily depends on 
the knowledge you possess. I must not be misunderstood. Your 
opinion of the materiality of that knowledge is of 110 moment. If a 
reasonable man would have recognized that it was material to disclose 
the knowledge in question, it is of no excuse that you did not 
recognize it to be so. But the question always is, Was the knowledge 
you possessed such that you ought to have disclosed it? Let me take an 
example. I will suppose that a man has, as is the case with most of us, 
occasionally had a headache. It may be that a particular one of those 
headaches would have told a brain specialist of hidden mischief. But to 
the man it was an ordinary headache undistinguishable from the rest. 
Now no reasonable man would deem it material to tell an insurance 
company of all the casual headaches he had had in his life, and, if he 
knew no more as to this particular headache than that it was an 
ordinary casual headache, there would be no breach of his duty 
towards the insurance company in not disclosing it. He possessed no 
knowledge that it was incumbent on him to disclose, because he knew 
of nothing which a reasonable Illan would deem material or of a 
character to influence the insurers in their action. It was what he did 
not know which would have been of that character, but he cannot be 
held liable for non-disclosure in respect of f~lcts which he did not 
know. l ? 
In Ireland, in h'/izlI/JClh AIIII KCllting v. New Ire/{///{/ Assurallcc COII/jIllny 
plc,IH the court had to consider whether or not an assured had to reveal 
material information to an insurer where that information was known to 
his doctors but not to him and where he had warranted the accuracy of 
the answers given in a proposal form. Mrs. Keating and her late husband 
had taken out a life insurance policy with the defendant insurer. At the 
medical examination conducted on behalf of the insurer, Mr. Keating 
inf(lrIlled the examiner that he had uIldergone an examination and 
treatment for what he believed to be epigastric discomfort. There was 
insul1icient evidence to establish that he knew that the examination had, 
17 Ibid at 884. 
18 [1990[ 2 I.IL 383. 
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in fact, revealed a condition of angina. In the proposal form lor 
insurance, Mr. Keating had answered a question about whether or not he 
had ever had any affection of the heart in the negative. A declaration in 
the policy made the policy conditional on the truth and completeness of 
all disclosures made. 19 When M r. Keating died and Mrs. Keating made a 
claim under the policy, the insurer sought to repudiate liability on the 
basis that material facts had not been disclosed. Not only did the 
common law require disclosure, but the contract itself warranted full 
and honest disclosure. Because the trial court f"(llll1d that, on the t~lcts, 
Mr. Keating did not know of his heart condition, Egan J. could go on to 
state that "non-disclosure can only be relevant to some t~lct of which the 
person has knowledge at the relevant time". In respect of the "legal 
basis" of the policy which required disclosure of all material facts of 
which the company "ought to be informed", the learned judge, echoing 
Fletcher Moulton J. in Joel, stated: "How can it be said that a person 
ought to disclose some [lets which he does not know about? How can 
h I (>" 20 (' I I' I I I' I e (0 so. Alnsequent y, t Ie Insurer cou l not repu( late tie 
agreement. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Walsh J. held that there could he no 
question of a t~lilure to disclose information about which the plaintiff and 
the deceased were not shown (in evidence) to have any knowledge. 
Furthermore, he was not prepared to accept that there was a warranty of 
complete disclosure (even of unknown facts) because the language of the 
agreement did not make it clear and unequivocal that that kind of 
warranty was intended. 21 Quoting Lord Mansfield in the English decision 
of Uoss v. J)/"iII!shmv,22 Walsh J. said that any "such warranty could never 
mean that a man has not in him the seeds of some disorder. We are all 
born with the seeds of mortality in us".v McCarthy J., in effect, agreed. 
The "insurer ... t~liled to establish either material non-disclosure or a 
I':! l/,ici at .IH5. 
20 l/,ici ,It .lH(,. 
21 III otitn words, the wording of the agrecmcnt did not make it incumbent on 
t IlllSl' who sought to enl,)fce tht' insurance policy to prove in the case of death 
tb.lt, at the time the insllrance was efkcted, the assured was in such a good state 
01 ite,t1th as not to sulkr hom anything, either knowingly or unknowingly, 
IVhiLlI IV,IS dangerous to life. 
22 (1701) I Will Ill. ,\12. 
2.1 II '!'!() I 2 1.Il.. .IH.l at .lH':!. 
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breach of warranty", he said. In the ronner case, he upheld the view of 
the trial judge that a person cannot be required to disclose some fact of 
which he is unaware. It is simply not non-disclosure to fail to reveal 
information about which one has no knowledge. Moreover, the fact 
that the three doctors concerned did know that there was some 
problem with the heart of the deceased could not impute knowledge to 
the deceased. Nor would he interpret the condition relating to accuracy 
in the answers to questions as a warranty of all J~lcts whether or not 
known by the insured. If such a warranty was to be included in the 
agreement, it had to be "expressed in clear terms without ambiguity ... If 
there is any ambiguity, it must be read against the persons who prepared 
it".24 
In the same case, Walsh J. noted that "insurers may stipulate for any 
warranty they please and if an assured undertakes that warranty, 
although it may be something not within his or her knowledge, he or 
she must abide the consequences.,,25 So, although under the common 
law duty of disclosure you cannot be expected to disclose a fact which is 
not within your knowledge, an insurer could, ex hypothesi, elect to 
stipulate, as a constituent element of the contract, f(lI' an absolute 
warranty as to the truth of something whether within or outside the 
knowledge of the assured. There are, however, a number of problems 
with such a clause in Ireland. First, it is casting the contractual nature of 
disclosure so broad as to frighten off most consumers who would, it is 
hoped, be too prudent to agree to such an unreasonable term. Secondly, 
stich a pansophic clause now runs the risk of being struck down by the 
Irish Insurance Federation's Codes of Practice of 1992, which provide 
iI/tel' aliI! that insurers should not reject claims where the fact is not one 
in the knowledge of the proposer or is a fact which the proposer could 
not reasonably be expected to know?6 Thirdly, the clause may now also 
possibly fall foul of Regulatioll 4 of the European Communities (Unfair 
24 Ibid at 394~395. 
25 Ibid at 3SH. 
20 See Regulation 3(a) Code of Practice on Life Assurance 1992; for similar 
provisions in respect of non-life assurance, see Regulations I (d) and 3 (a)(i) 
Code of Practice on Non-I.ife Insurance, 1992. As regards the Irish Insurance 
Codes of Practice and basis of contract clauses, see Slipi'll n. 39. For limitations, 
however, on the employment of the Codes of Practice and the EUH,lpean 
Communities Regulations, see slipra n. 41. 
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Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations, J 995.27 I say "possibly" in 
respect of the Regulations given that they are somewhat limited in that 
the Courts are not permitted to assess the tilirness of any term which 
defines the subject matter of the contracl. 28 It is likely, then, that most 
of the obligations imposed by warranties in an insurance policy may be 
seen as defining and controlling the risk run by the insurer and 
therefore t:l11 outside the scope of the Regulations. 29 This limitation, 
however, is subject to the proviso that the core terms are drafted in 
plain, intelligible language, thereby leaving it open to a court to ignore 
the special, non-reviewable status attached to core terms where there 
meanings are in doubt. In such circumstances, the term will be subject 
to the full force of the regulations. Moreover, and on the premise that 
basis of contract clauses, in particular, are "unintelligible to the majority 
of consumers",30 and given the asperity with which they have been 
viewed by the judiciary who have, on occasion, referred to them as 
"mean and contemptible",.lt as re~ulting in assureds being "shockingly 
I II I" ,) I " . . I'" B·· I . I I I )a( y treale( " - am as a VICIOUS t eVlce ," It IS su lmltlet tlat tle 
aforementioned proviso affords some degree of latitude to the judiciary 
to bring such clauses -- where they relate to consumers _. within the 
realm of the regulations and, consequently, enable a determination of 
27 It provides: "A term shall not of itself be considnnl to be ulli:lir by relatioll to 
the definition of the m.lin subject maller of the contract or to the adequacy of 
tht: prict: and remuneration, as against the goods and services supplit:d, in so t'll" 
as the~e krms are in plain, intelligibk language", For a similar provision in 
England and Waks, see Regulation 6(2) (ex 3(2)) of the Unf'lir Terms in 
Consumer Contralls Regulations 1<)<)<). 
28 See Clark, R. "Contract l.aw in Ireland," Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 
!Jublin, 19<)8: Pl'. 1<)·1·-197; t\krkin, It and Angus, It "EC Insurance l.Jw," 
l.ongman, London, 1<)<)7: pp. 4550. 
2<) On the other hand, Regulation 4 should make nOli-core terms more vulnerable 
to challenge: for example, terms whidl insist on policyholders giving immediate 
notice of an insured ptTil occurring would not presumably lidl within it's ambit 
and lould. accordingly, ht: challenged on the basis of their unfairness . 
.\0 Adams, /.1'. il.lsis of contract clauses in insurance contracts and the consumer. 
'lite 101111/111 oj Iiw;IIt',; 1.1111', 1\1.IY (200tJ). Pl'. 20.1-213 at 212. 
31 (,'/i,I-'1I1I1I1 I'. /1I11'lIs/l;r,' A.,;lilwl,e 11927J A.C. 139 at 144 per Lord Wrenbury, 
,\2 11/11,1-11)' I', / ,Jlldoll (;,'11,'1111 /1I,lIIWICe Co. !.ttl \ 19:15) 51 L1 Lit 20 \ at 202 per 
Swilt J. 
U /III/,It /11>111/11/(,' CPIIII'IIII}, I'. Morrisoll It942 J I All Lit 529 at 537 per Lord 
(;leL'IIt' I\tlt 
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their unfairness VI5-(/-VI5 the signillcant imbalance in the parties 
II ' . ,4 0) IgatlOns: 
The significance of the Insurance Codes of Practice and the European 
Communi ties (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 
assume even greater gravitas in Ireland when one considers the 
formalistic and mechanical logic applied by the Irish judiciary, on 
occasion, to basis of contract clauses. In Pa/rick Keellllll 1'. Shield 
[Ilsure/Ilce Co. Ud,35 for example, the following declaration at the foot of a 
proposal form was the subject of judicial deliberation: "I hereby declare 
that the above particulars are true and complete in every respect and that 
no material bct has been suppressed or withheld." Essentially the basis of 
the argument reposed in the contractual construction of the declaration 
in the proposal form, with counsel ii.)!" the assured arguing that the 
warranty as to the veracity of answers given only related to answers which 
withheld or suppressed a material Jact. In other words, the two parts of 
the declaration - (a) that the answers are true and complete in every 
respect; and, (b) that no material fact had been suppressed or withheld-
should be read together with the elTect that the laller part (b), would be 
imported into and qualify the former. In the opinion of Blayney J., 
however, the declaration was composed of two separate and autogenous 
statements: "the first statement relates to the obligation of the plaintiff to 
give correct answers, since these are made the basis of the contract, and 
the second relates to the obligation at common law, arising from the 
nature of the contract of insurance to make full disclosure of all material 
j~lcts".36 Accordingly, the insurer could avoid the contract on the basis of 
breach of warranty. By contrast, in England and Wales, in the decision of 
Hair v. Pruden/illl ASSlIrtll1Ce Compllll)' Ud,:\? the following warranty was 
the subject of judicial examination: ") wish to insure ... and warrant that 
all the information entered above is true and complete and that nothing 
34 But f()r limitations on the employment of the Unfair Terms Regulations, see 
5 lip rtI. n. 41. 
35 Unreported, High Court. Ll February 1987. 
36 Ibid at p. 5. The learned judge also noted: "If [counsel for the assmed'sj 
contention were to be accepted it would involve treating the second part of the 
sentence as if it read 'and Ihllt ill tile 11IIswers to the ljueslio1lS no material bet had 
been suppressed or withhrld'. I can see no justification for adding in this 
qualification and, accordingly, I must reject this submission". Ibid. 
37 [19831 2 Lloyd's Rep. 667. 
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materially affect ing the risk has been cOllcealed". I n respect of the 
warranty, Woolf J. noted: "I am bound to say that if it was intended that 
an assured should answer matters even though he is not being questioned 
about them, I would expect a different form of statement from the one to 
which I have just made reference. I would have expected something to be 
said which clearly indicated to a proposer that, although they had not 
been asked any specil1c questions about the n1<ltter, if there was 
something which was relevant to the risk which they knew of, but which 
was not covered by the questions, they should deal with it, and leave a 
space for them to do SO."58 Thus, it was held that a statement on a 
proposal form by which an assured warranted that his or her answers 
were true operated as an implied waiver to information about which 
speci(\c questions had not been asked. 
Though perhaps divaricating slightly, it is engaging to contrast the 
judicial interpretation of the basis of contract clause in fluir with that of 
Keellllll given the similarity of expression but dissimilarity of construc-
tion of the clauses. In fIlii,., the conjunction "and" in the clause was read 
as being subordinating in design, thereby operating as an implied waiver 
of infiJrmation about which specific questions had not been asked. In 
KeCI/IIll, by contrast, the conjunction "and" in the clause was read as 
operating to the principle of coordination, thereby allowing the 
perceptioIl that both parts of the clause were independent and 
cUlllulative. In choosing the more emendated interpretation, there are, 
it is submitted, [wo competing demands at play. On the one hand, it is 
well recognized that the remedy for breach of warranties is ignominious 
and, accordingly, every effort should be made to construe them col/tm 
pro./erclltes insurers where ambiguity exists as per Ilair in England and 
Wales. On the other hand, the role of judicial construction is to give 
effect to the manifest intention of the parties as discernible from the 
clause and the entire instrument if needs be as per Keel/all in Ireland. 
Applying the reasoning in Kecl/i/1l to the basis of contract clause in flair, 
the deduction that can be made therefrom is that if the warranty in I Jair 
was to be construed as relating only to the ,1I1swers about which the 
assured was being questioned, as Woolf J. did, it would involve treating 
the stnlIld part of the warranty as if it read "and Ihat nothing malerially 
alleding the risk ill tile {1I/SII'CfS to tilc IflieSliol/s poscd il/ the proposi/l jimll 
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has been concealed". As such, the Irish Courts currently have a 
formalistic precedent to the implied effect that the turn of the scale 
against the insurer in Hair was recherclll! in that the basis of contract 
clause in the case, though legally complex, was not ambiguous. The 
author's diffidence about applying such a logic to basis of contract 
clauses is grounded in the consideration that, even in the absence of 
ambiguity, stich clauses may well be unintelligible to the majority of 
conslImers who are !lot conversant with insurance rhetoric. It is 
tempered, to some extent, by the realization that the Irish Insurance 
Codes of Practice39 and, perhaps, the European Community (Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 - if it can he shown 
that the clause was not drafted in plain, intelligible language, a safeguard 
which, it is posited, is broader than the colltra prolcrelltes doctrine - Illay 
offer some redress to private policyholders and consumers respectively, 
though not to commercial assureds, What is clear, however, is that if the 
I ' I ' I I I' I "JO I' I ns 1 courts conlll1uc to re y on slle 1 mee 1amca reasomng as app let 
in Keellllll or the proposition in KClllillg that insurers can elect for any 
warranty they desire, the importance of the lnsurance Codes, despite the 
3') See Paragraph J (b) of the Irish Insllrance Codes of Practice (life provisions), 
J 992, which provide: "Neither the propos,lI form nor the policy shall contain 
any general provision converting the statements as to past or present fact in the 
proposal form into warranties except where the w,lrranty relates to a statement 
of f;lcl concerning the life to be assured under a 'life of another' policy, Insurers 
may, however, require specific warranties about matters which are material to 
the risk," Paragraph 3(b) of the provisions provide that "except where fraud is 
involved, an insurer will not reject a claim or invalidate a policy 011 grounds of 
breach of warranty unless the circuJl1stances of the claim are connected with the 
breach and unless: (i) the warranty relates to a statement of fact concerning the 
life to be assured under a 'life of another' policy .. , or (ii) the warranty was 
creakd in relation to specific mailers material to the risk and it was drawn to 
the proposer's allention at or bcf()re the making of the contract", For similar 
nOll-life provisions, see I (b) and :~(a)(iii) Irish Insurance Codes of Practice, 
1992, 




fact that they do not enjoy binding force of iaw,41 and the European 
Community Regulations42 cannot be underemphasized. 
In returning to the principal motif of this section, there is one further 
issue which merits discussion, at this juncture, in respect of Keating. It 
concerns the determination, and in particular the method of reasoning 
by which such a determination was reached, of whether or not James 
Keating had I/c///Ill knowledge that he suffered from angina at a time when 
the duty of disclosure was pertinent. In the High Court, Egan J. held that 
"he [james Keatingl did not know of this condition at the time of the 
execution orthe policy".'Ll In the Supreme Court, Walsh J. stated: "It was 
not established in the High Court, and from the evidence there is no 
inference which mllst necessarily be drawn, that the deceased Of his wife 
made any false statements as to the state of health of the late Mr. Keating 
or that they tokl anything other than what they believed to be the 
truth .... There was no evidence by which it could be held that he was 
aware of the bct that he had angina pectoris or that such condition was 
ever revealed to him by his medical advisers.,,·I.j McCarthy J. noted: "One 
cannot disclose what one docs not know albeit this puts a premium on 
ignorance. It may well be that wilful ignorance would raise significant 
other isslIes; sllch is not the case here. If the proposer for life assurance 
has answered all the questions to the best of his ability and truthfully, his 
41 It is hoped that Irish insurers, in the light of the Codes, would not now rely on a 
purely technical defence to defeat a /JOIltI fide claiill. It should also be pointed 
out however that there is no certainty that the Codes will be complied with by 
insurers who are nut members of the Irish Insurance I:uicration; this caution 
should not, however, be overemphasized given that a very sizeable percentage of 
insur,lIlce business in Ireland is undertaken by members of the Pederation. See 
KemJl, 1\1. The Irish Insurance Federation- A profile. Irish Il/sl/ral/ce I,{/\v 
ReFic\\', \ (\) (.'C()()()): 20. It sllOul,1 also be pointed out that the InslIf<lnce Codes 
of l'r,rctice and the l'uropean Comillunities I{egulations only apply to private 
policylwldns and COIlSUIllLT' respectivdy. 
-12 S<:'L' also I{egul-rtion <>( I) of the l.ife Assurance (Provision of Inl(lflnation) 
HegulatillllS. 200\ (S.L No. 15 of 2(01), enalled pursuant to the Insurance Act, 
tlJtl'J, as amended by the Insurance Act, 2000, which require suppliers of life 
assurance in Ireland to provide ddaiied information to ciicnb resident in 
Ireland bcl(li'e they sign a proposal f()fIll in respect of life assurance including 
thL' cirnllllStances in whidr a policy can be ccrncelled, and the consequences of 
Lriling III disclose Illaterial "rels or providing incorrect illformation when 
completing Ihe form . 
• 1.\ [ tlJ9() [ 2 I.lC j8j al .186. 
-1·1 Ibid ,rl .18lJ. 
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next of kin are not to be damnified because of his ignorance or 
obtuseness which may sometimes be due to a mental block on mailers 
affecting one's health."45 Though obiter, it is submilled that such a 
proposition conceals f~lr more than it reveals. C;iven the aleatory nature 
of insurance contract law, and the need to prevent the suppression of 
information, a proviso that ignorance or obtuseness about facts- due for 
example to a mental block (which a priori assumes that the assured had 
actual knowledge preceding the mental block) - need not be disclosed 
must, in the absence of further refinement, be of doubtful validity. As 
noted in MllcGillivmy: "if a fact is material and within the knowledge of 
the assured ... , the assured is under an absolute duly to disclose it ... 
Mistake or forgetfulness affords no defence".46 Moreover, there was little 
or no fastidious rellection in the judgments on the contested nature of 
the actual knowledge of the assured. On the one hand, it could be argued 
that inferences could be drawn from the actual knowledge of the assured 
on the following basis: all his medical advisers knew he had angina before 
the duty of disclosure arose;47 he spent two days in Baggot Street 
Ilospital with a "well known" cardiologist; whilst there, he underwent 
extensive cardiac investigations including a stress FCC and an 
angiogram, for which he gave his consent (these investigations revealed 
a considerable narrowing of the arteries and that his condition was 
moderately severe); that a patient at the hospital "would normally get the 
gist of his condition from one of the team before his discharge and be 
given suitable advice"; that he was prescribed two drugs which were 
specific for angina; and, that Dr. Gearty at Baggot Street Hospital testified 
to the effect that "he should have known that the whole area of interest 
was the heart, and that we are dealing with X-ray pictures of the heart 
and we were treating him with tablets for the heart". These, then, would 
have to be ranged against the following pleadings: that James Keating 
45 l/liti at 392. 
46 Ibid at 394. Paragraph 3(a)(iii) of the life provsiollS and 3(a)(i) of the non-life 
provisions of Ihe Irish Insurance Codes of Practice do however provide Ihat an 
inslifer should nol invalidate a policy unless it is a bct which Ihe proposer 
could reasonably be expected to disclose. 
47 The fact thai his medical advisers knew that he had angina cannot be employed 
to impllte kllowledge; albeit peripheral it could, however, be employed along 




believed he had epigastric discomfort which was disclosed to the insurer's 
medical examiner; that he also disclosed that he had stayed in Baggot 
Street Hospital with a doctor who would have been known to the 
insurer's medical examiner as a "well known cardiologist"; that his 
medical advisers did not advise him directly that he had angina before 
the duty of disclosure arose; that there could "possibly" be a weakness in 
the extent to which the routine (that patients receive a direction as to 
their condition) at Baggo\ Street Hospital was adhered to; that his 
discharge note from the hospital stated that the initial report was good 
and that a full report was to f(JlIow; and, that he did not know the nature 
or the purpose of the tablets he was prescribed. 
In determining whether or not it could be inferred from the primary 
knowledge of James Keating that he had actual knowledge of his 
condition, it is submitted that the absonant issues should have been 
construed in the light of the following question: would a reasonable man 
with no special knowledge of any kind have bibl to appreciatc that he 
was possessed of knowledge and information in relation to his health, 
and his condition of angina in particular, which were of matcriality? No 
dissection or exposition of this kind was forthcoming in the High Court 
or Supreme Court: it was simply posited that there was no evidence4H by 
which it could be held that he was aware of the fact that he had angina. 
Of course, the answer to the posed question might well be that no 
inference could be drawn from the primary knowledge of James Keating 
which would reveal that he knew of his condition. The call iilr more 
compelling and plausible reasoning, however, is directed ttl!' the most 
4l:1 ()f course the Supreme (:ourl was extremely reluctant to interfere with the 
linding of priIllary I,ll( Illade in the IIigh Court once there was evidence 10 
support the finding made, Set', for exanlple, DIIlllle v. Nilliollil/ Millemily 
Ilt),/,ilil/ [1<)WJi 1.1{. <)1. It could be argued, however, and wilh only a slight 
deIllenl of mischief, th,\! thcre \Vas a lack of c1arillcation on evidence lendered, 
I'iz IVht'rt' the 1;Il!lt lay in t.rking down Dr. Cearty's name incorredly, and lhe 
signiliLllIce of the false reply to the question concerning the names and 
.Iddresst's of dndors allrnded in the proposal form. See SII/,rtI n. 125. This 
L'iusivellt"s IV.rS cOIllpounded by the fact that Egan J. in the High Court never 
rL'l~Tr"d in thl' wurse of his judglllent to lhe signilicance of the drugs prescribed 
lor angina or that Dr. (;earty at Baggol Street I Iospilallestilied to the ef/CCl th<lt 
Ih,' 'L,sured "should have known that the whole area or interest was the heart, 
.l1Id Ih.lt lVe wCI'e dealing with X-ray pictures of the heart, and we were treating 
hilll with tablets for the heart". 
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part at the lila 11 II e'yl in which the decision was reached rather than the 
(letllol decisiol1 - though, by implication, its foundations look more 
unsteady. Indeed concern about the unsystematic analysis of the question 
of knowledge, and in particular the inferences Ihat could be drawn from 
the actual knowledge of the assured, assumes even greater gravitas when 
it is borne in mind that the said question was the pivotal consideration -
around which the other issues oscillated - in the case: once it was 
established that the <1ssured did not have actual knowledge of his 
condition, common law non-disclosure was rendered otiose; similarly, 
the warranty, which made the policy conditional on the truth and 
completeness of all disclosures made, could be construed against the 
insurers on the basis that they had not expressed in unequivocal language 
that the assured was required, inler alia, to disclose facts of which he was 
50 I II· . . I . I I I· unaware.- n al ( Itlon, a more systematIc anl conSll ere( ana YSIS may 
have afforded the Supreme Court the opportunil y to expressly approve 
of a less objective threshold as regards inferences that could be drawn 
from the primary knowledge of consumers - the outcome of the case 
Illay have been the same, but, by expressly enshrining this less objective 
criterion, juristic clarity would have been enhanced. 
At common law, and as noted, an assured must disclose to the insurer, 
before the contract is concluded, Illaterial circumstances which are 
within his or her actual knowledge.51 What, though, of material facts 
49 This argument, to some extent, calls to mind a story recounted by Jerome Frank in 
COllrts Oil Trilll in 1950: "You will perhaps recall the famous English judge who 
gave this advice to a newly-appointed member of the bench. 'Slate your 
conclusions but never your reasons. Your conclusions will probably be right; your 
reasons wiliusually be wrong'." Frank, J. "Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in 
American Justice," Princeton University Press, Princeton, 19S0: p. 387. 
50 See also, in Ireland, ()live Cllrrull v. Norwich Ullioll Lire Jllsllrallce Society 
Unreported (H.C.) 30 October, 19H7 where it was stated th~lt a proposer for life 
assurance had to disclose, illta II/ill, that continuing medication had been 
prescribed for him by his family doClor. It appears, however, Ihat routine visits 
to a doctor need nol be disclosed. As noted by Davies J. in I.ce I'. British I.tlw 
/l/SlIrtIllCe Co. Ltd 11972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 49 at 55, the assured must only disclose 
the fact of a routine visit to a doctor if there was "something that should have 
stuck in his mind and was quile different frolll the ordinary routine visits thai 
one makes". 
51 This is a relatively straightforward question of fact in respect of natural 
assureds. Jt becomes more tortuous when the question of knowledge is 
examined from a corporate vista in that the knowledge of the persons who 
constitute the knowledge of the company for the purpose of disclosltre need to 
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which the insured ought in the ordinary course of business to have 
known but fails to disclose because he or she did not know of them? The 
answer appears to be that the duty of making disclosure is not simply 
confined to such facts as are within the actual knowledge of the assured -
it extends to all material facts which the assured "ought in the ordinary 
course of business to have known", and he cannot escape the 
consequences of not disclosing them on the ground that he did not 
know them. 52 In other words, a certain level of presumed or constructive 
knowledge can be imputed to the insured seeking cover in the course of 
business. Such an imputation, however, will not ordinarily apply to 
ordinary consumer insurance.53 As McCarthy J. noted in Keating: "The 
insurer might well contend that the deceased ought to have known that 
there was some problem arising with his heart; the onus, however, of 
proving that he did know lies upon the insurer; it is not sufficient to 
prove that he ought to have known".54 In England or Wales, however, an 
attempt was made by Roskill J. in Godfrey v. Brilallnie Assurance 
Company Ltd to impute knowledge to an assured in an ordinary 
consumer insurance contract. 55 Here the assured was asked the following 
question in a life assurance proposal f(Hm: "Have you suffered from any 
illness or accident or received medical advice or treatment, with or 
without an operation". The assured responded that he had lost four 
fingers on his left hand in an accident but had no other illnesses or 
bl: idenlified. In MllcGillil'my il was submilled lhal the knowledge of lhose who 
represenl the "direding mind and will of the company and who conlrol whal il 
does, is lo be idenlified as the company's knowledge, whelher or nol lhey are 
responsible for arranging the insurance cover in question". Legh-Jones, N. 
(cd.). "MacGillivray on Insurance Law," Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997: 
p. 3'12. See, for example, Regil/!l FlIr C(J. 1'. BossoJr/ [19571 2 Lloyd's Rep. 466. 
52 Section 18( I) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. 
53 There is, however, one occasion where an assured who is seeking insurance 
outside the course of husiness may have knowledge imputed to him or her. This 
will arise "only where a person with actual knowledge can properly be described 
as an agent of the assured with a legal duty either express or implied to 
communicate his knowkdge to the assured. If, lheref,lre, the assured entrusts 
the management or safekeeping of the insured property to an employee or agent 
and the latter is aware of cirnlIl1slances affecting thal properly which are 
maleri.d lo the proposed insurance, the assllfed will be trealed as knowing whal 
his employee or agent knew whether or not he receives the relevant 
infurlllatioll". Ml/c(;illiI'J"ilj', op. cit. n. 51 al p. 394. 
54 [1990 I 2 l.lt .lH:l at 392. 
55 [1%.\ 1 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515 . 
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accidents. The court accepted that the assured had no indication at all at 
the time of completing the proposal form that he had a kidney complaint 
of some substance. In the months leading up to signing the proposal 
form, however, the assured had been told by his doctors that he had 
minor kidney trouble and should lead a careful life, tests at Westminster 
Hospital revealed no change in that condition, and an X-ray revealed that 
he had a lung infection. The court held that these were material facts - of 
which the assured had actual knowledge by inference - non-disclosure of 
which enabled the insurer to avoid the policy. Roskill J., however, went 
on to state obiter that even if it was accepted that the assured did not have 
knowledge of the material facts outlined, nevertheless they were facts 
which "he ought to know and therefore must be treated as having 
known".56 The proposition that such an imputation can apply to 
ordinary insurance contracts in England mllst however be viewed as 
extremely doubtful. More recently, Simon Brown L.J. in ECOllolllides v. 
Commercial Assurallce Co. PLC stated:57 "It is clearly established that an 
assured ... effecting insurance cover as a private individual and not in the 
'ordinary course of business' must disclose only material l~lCts known to 
him; he is not to have ascribed to him any form of deemed or 
constructive knowledge." 
What, then, of those facts which fall within the ambit of the "ordinary 
course of business". In England and Wales, in the marine insurance case 
of Proudfout v. MUlltejiore,58 for example, the plaintiff effected a policy of 
insurance on a cargo of madder shipped on board a vessel called the 
Anile DltllCllIl from Symrna to Liverpool. The cargo was purchased and 
shipped by one Rees in the course of his employment as an agent of the 
plaintiff. On January 12, 1861, he sent a letter containing the invoice and 
weights of the shipment to the plaintiff. On January 19, 1861, he 
forwarded a letter to the plaintiff enclosing the bill of lading. The ship 
sailed from Smyrna on January 21, 1861 but was wrecked on 23 nl with 
total loss of cargo. Knowledge of the loss was communicated to Rees on 
January 24. Two days later, Rees communicated by letter to the plaintiff 
of the loss of the vessel, and also explained that he did not dare telegraph 
"for when once you had the intelligence in hand you were prevented 
56 J/Jiri at 532. 
57 [1998J C).B. 587 at 601. 
58 (I867) LIt 2 Q.B. 511. 
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from insuring". On January 31, the plaintiff, having received the letlers 
sent on Tanuary 12 and [9, but prior to receipt o(the letter ofJClTluary 26, 
gave instructions to effect the policy. There was no evidence of fraud or 
undue concealment by the plaintiff of a material fact within his 
knowledge. The question then aro8e as 10 whelher the plaintiJf assured 
was deemed to have constructive knowledge of the loss as a result of the 
conduct of his agent. It was held that the agent failed in (he ordinary 
course of employment to communicate information to his principal as to 
the state of Ihe ship and cargo. Accordingly, and though the principal 
had no knowledge of Ihe fact that the cargo had beelJ lost, the policy was 
void on the ground of non-disclosure of a material fact by the agent of 
the insured. As Cockburn c.r. noted with characteristic acuity: "{llE an 
agent, whose duty it is, in the ordinary course of business, to 
communicate information to his principal as to the state of a ship and 
cargo, omits to discharge sl/ch duty, and the owner, in the absence of 
information as tu any fact material to be communicated to the 
underwriter, effects an insurance, such insurance will be void, on (he 
ground of concealment or misrepresentation. The insurer is entitled to 
assume, as the basis of the contract between him and the assured, that the 
latter will comnlllnicale to him every material fact of which the assured 
has or, in the ordinary course of business, ought to have knowledge."s9 
In Australia lIlid New Lea/lllld lJtlllk Uti P. Colonial Fagle and Wharves 
Ltd; Hoalo McNair J. was prepared to accept that section 18 of the 
Marine Insurance Act of 1906 could be applied to non-marine insurance, 
lloting Ihat Ihis was lhe trend in textbooks sLlch as MacGillivray.Cit The 
case arose as a result of the misdelivery by the defendants in 1957 and 
]958 of 246 bales of wool which were kept ill their warehouse. The 
plaintiff bank had sent the wool - which tht::y were holding as security-
to the defendants warehouse \vith instructions that the bales were not to 
59 Illid at 521 ~522. 
6() 11Y60l 2 Lloyd's Hep. 241-
61 lie also remglli~cd that there were some strong jlHlidal dicta to the contrary 
,lilt! ,d!wkd ill parlindar to the judgmellt of Fletcher MoultoIl J. in Ioel 1'. Law 
UliiOIi Croll'lI where he stated that "you cannot disclose what you do not 
know". SlI/'FiI ll. 7. McNair J. argued, however, that this dictullI of Fletcher 
tvlou!ton J. cllltid not be pressed too hlr since in the case no question o( the 
knnwkdgc' oC any servant or ,Igcnt was involved. See also Sill/I/er 1'. New India 
:\"111<111,',' Cll. I.ta \ 1995j l..R.L.R. 240. 
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be released except on the bank's authority or the production of the 
bank's delivery orders. The defendants, however, delivered 246 bales of 
wool to the importer without the bank's authority. The bank had not 
recovered the advances it had made to the wool importer against these 
baJes and il sllccessfuJ1y sued the defendants {or the resulting loss. The 
defend'dnts now claimed that sum from a third party, Mr. 13oag, a 
representative Lloyd's underwriter, under two Lloyd's all-risk policies for 
the years 1957 and 1958. The third party insurer) however, denied 
JiabiJity alleging, inter alia, that it was entitled to repudiate liability on the 
grounds of non-disclosure of;l material fael. It appears thaI it had heen a 
custom of one of the employees of the defendants to allow important 
customers to take delivery of orders without bank releases first being 
obtained. The third party insurer now claimed that this constituted non-
disclosure of a materi<ll fact by the defendants in that they ought to have 
known that their system of operation was such that the goods held by 
them to the order of one person - sllch as the bank - could be and were 
habilually released by them without the knowledge, consent or order of 
that person to another person (in this case to the wool importer). 
Although it was conceded that nobody in authority had knowledge of 
this practice, it was known to al) employee, the chief entry clerk, and this 
knowledge could be imputed to the company because it is knowledge it 
would have known if it had made such inquiries as to its system of 
operation as a reasonably prudent wharfingering company in the 
ordinary course of husiness would have made. In respect ()f this 
submission, McNair J. stated: 
1 have been referred to no authority to suggest that the board of the 
company proposing to insure owe any duty to carry out a detailed 
investigation as to the manner in which the company's operations are 
performed, and I know of no principle in laws which leads to that 
result. If a company is proposing to insure wages in transit, 1 cannot 
believe that they owe a duty to the insurers to Jind out exactly how the 
weekl}' wages are ill fact carried (rom their bank to their premises, 
Ihough clearly they must not deliberately close their eyes 10 defects in 
the system and must disclose any suspiciol1$ or misgivings they have. 
To impose such an obligation upon the proposer is tantamount 10 
holding thaI insurers only insure persons who conduct their business 
pnu!enlly, whereas it is commonplace {hat one of the purposes of 
insurance is to cover yourself against your own negligence or the 
negligence of your servants. As to the facts, it seems to me that any 
ps 
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reasonable inquiries the board could be expected to make would only 
have revealed, as was proved to be the fact, that the system ill 
operation for many years had in t~lct worked satisfactorily in the sense 
that no difficulty had arisen and no claim had been made.62 
III the light of this dictum by McNair J. in Altstralia tlllt! New Zealand 
Balik Ltd, Arnould noted: "The test of what 'ought to be known' by the 
assured is not, therefore, an objective test of what ought to be known by a 
reasonable, prudent assured carrying on a business of the kind in 
question, but a test of what ought to be known by the assured in the 
ordinary course of carrying on his business in the manner in which he 
carries on that business."63 In MacGillivray, it is similarly suggested: 
"The assured is deemed to know only what he would be expected to 
know in the ordinary course of his own business, making allowance for 
its imperfect organization, prior to the conclusion of the insurance. 
Therefore he is not deemed to be aware of matters which should be 
known in the course of a well run business, which he would have found 
out if he had re-orgallized his schedllle or business system at the time in 
quest ion."M In cont radist inction to Arnollld and MacGillivray, Clarke 
submitted the following in respect of what "ought to be known". He 
stated: "It would be odd, if the law applied an objective standard to 
inferences that the proposer draws from what he knows, as well as an 
objective standard of materiality by reference to the prudent insurer or 
sometimes, the reasonable insured, and yet allowed the proposer to 
conduct his business in such a negligent way that facts never come to his 
attention in the tlrst place, so that the objective rules are never allowed to 
bite. It is submitted that he is taken to know what he should know in the 
ordinary course of his kind of business."65 Nevertheless, Diamond J., in 
the English decision of Silllller I'. New India Asslmlllee Co. Ud, approved 
of AuwlIld and adopted a test - in respect of the ambit of the 
presumption "deemed to know" - of what ought to be known by the 
assured in the ordinary course of carrying on his business in the manner 
ill which he carries on that business. Though at a surbce level sLlch a 
proposition lacks a certain symmetry, as alluded to by Clarke, it is 
(,2 [19b() [ 2 I.loyd's I~cp. 2,11 at 252. 
h.1 1'-lllstill, M. and (;illllan, J. "Arnollld's Law oC Marine Insurance amI Average," 
S[cvcns & SOilS, I.ondon, 19H I: p. '1IlH. 
b·t !I/<lcCil/il'rtly II/,. ci/. 11. 51 at p. 393. 
h) (:I,\I'kc, M. "The I.aw oC InslIrance COlltracts," I.LI', London, 1994: p. 582. 
376 
Ireland: An Old Doctrine of Insurance I.aw Revisited 
submitted that it should be adopted in Ireland on the grounds that it 
tends towards a less objective threshold which, given the harshness of the 
remedy for non-disclosure, can only be commended. Moreover, given 
the lrish Supreme Court decision in Keating which - impliedly --- tends 
towards a less objective st<lndard as regards the inferences that can be 
drawn from the primary knowledge of the consumer assured, the 
assymetrical qualities of the proposition are not, it is submitted, as great 
as may first be thought. 
What is irrefutable, in any event, from the cited passage of McNair J. 
in AlIstmlill and New Zellllllld Ullllk Ltd is that no special inquiries as to 
facts outside the knowledge of the assured need to be undertaken f(l\" the 
insurer; of course if an assured turns a blind eye - sometimes referred to 
as "Nelsonian blindness» - and desists from an investigation of material 
circulllstances of which he or she was suspicious or had good reason to 
believe existed, he or she is to be regarded as knowing whatever such a 
reasonable inquiry would have revealed.h6 This begs the question, 
however, about the consequences of knowledge discovered of the risk as a 
result or an investigation by the assured which would normally exceed 
that expected by an insurer in respect of disclosure. In such 
circumstances, and where the insurer is unaware of the investigation, is 
there an obligation on the assured to disclose the findings to the insurer? 
Though there is a dearth of judicial dicta on the vexed question, Clarke 
submits, correctly in the author's view, as filllows: "The law is normally 
reluctant to reward diJigence with the crown of heavier duties than those 
generally imposed on the reasonable man in his position, lest it 
discourage the voluntary investigation of risks which might better 
prevent loss. However, in insurance law, it appears that, if the proposer 
has arranged an investigation, the results of that investigation must be 
made known to the insurer, whether the insurer could have expected the 
66 See also 1l/l/ckIJllrll, Loll' I/lld Co. 1'. Vigors (I HH7) 12 API'. Cas. 531 at 537. See 
(//50 Sill/llcr 1'. NelV 111dill ASSIII"IIIICe Co. Ltd where Diamond J. noted: "It is clear 
that knowledge includes not only 'any communication made to, or in/(>rIllation 
received by the assured', but also the kind of knowledge expressed in the phrase 
turning a 'blind eye'. If the assured, suspicious of material circulllstances which 
ought to be disclosed, turm a blind eye and refrains from enquiry, h, is to be 
regarded as knowing whatever such enquiry would have revealed". 11995] 
L.R.LR. 240 at 252. 
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proposer to make the investigation or 110t.,,67 As such, it is submitted 
that an insured is only expected to know what ought to be known by him 
or her in the ordinary course of carrying on a business in the manner in 
which he or she carries on that business; if, however, an insured has 
carried out an investigation - which is of a special and detailed kind 
beyond what ought to be known by a reasonable insured in that kind of 
business - the fruits of that investigation should be disclosed if they 
unearth material circumstances. 
Moreover, though confirming the proposition Jaid down by Cockburn 
c.J. in Proudfoot that the insurer is entitled to assume on the basis of the 
contract between the underwriter and the assured that the latter will 
communicate every material fact that he or she has or ought to have 
knowledge of in the ordinary course of business, the learned judge in 
AlIstmlia (lnd New Zealand Bank Ltd was not disposed to the view that 
the case was governed by the principle that the knowledge of the agent 
was the knowledge of the principal: "to lay down as an abstract 
proposition of law that every agent, no maller how limited the scope of 
h is agency, would bind every principal even by his acts is obviously and 
upon the f~lCe of it absurd".68 On the facts of the case, McNair J. held that 
the employee did not fall within the limited class of agents who can 
impute knowledge to the proposers of insurance, in that his duties were 
almost entirely clerical and he had no executive authority. But even if, ex 
hypothesi, the employee fell within the class of persons whose knowledge 
is to be imputed to his principal, he was - in accordance with the dictum 
of Lord Atkill in Hell v. I.ever Hrothers6~ - under no duty to report his 
own dereliction of duty, and his knowledge of that dereliction is noL to be 
imputed to his principals. The reason for this may be simply stated: it 
cannoL be supposed that in the ordinary course of business an agent will 
67 Cl.lrke, "J> lit 11. 65 at p. 581. 
68 I/,i.! at p. 25.~. 
6') "Thl' Sl'rvallt owes a duty not to steal, but, having stolen, is there superadded a 
duty to mnkss that he has stolen? I am satisfied that to imply such a duty would 
be a departure froll! the well established usage of mankind and would be to 
lTl'.t1l' obligations entirely outside the moral contemplation of the parties 
wllcerned". [1,).12] A.C. 1(,1 at 228 . 
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disclose his or her own fraud or, as in the Australia alld New Ze{/[mlll 
Balik Case, misconduct to his or her principaJ.70 
In respect of the agents' knowledge being that of the assured, it has 
been suggested in England and Wales that there are three different 
situations ill which it wiII arise. First, there is a class of agent ~ the agent 
to know ~ on whom an assured relies for information. 71 Secondly, there 
is a class of agent who is in such a "predominant position" in relation to 
the assured that his or her knowledge can be regarded as the knowledge 
of the assured.72 These two categories of agent, according to English law, 
fall within the ambit of section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 
which stipulate what the assured must disclose to the insurer. The 
function of the agent under this section is to keep the assured informed 
70 In pew SYlldicates 1'. pew ReillSlIrers [19961 I Lloyd's r~ep. 241, it was 
submitted that because section 19(1) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 does 
not proceed by Ihe route of impuling, altributing, or deeming Ihe knowledge of 
Ihe agenl 10 be Ihe knowledge of the principal, the llmlll'shire LlIld principle--
which provides that if an agent is acting in fraud of his or her principal and Ihe 
mal tel' is relevant to Ihe fraud, thai knowledge, as an exceplion, is not 10 be 
impuled to the principal - cannot apply to agents to insure on the basis Ihat the 
agent 10 insure must disclose every material circumstance Ihal he or she knows, 
and that includes his or dishoneslY. Staughton L.J., with Rose LJ. concurring, 
however, grounded his argument on the premise that the llmllpshire Llllld 
principle was not confined to cases where the agent's knowledge is by law to be 
imputed or allributed to the principal; rather it extended to any case where the 
principal's rights are afleeted if Ihe agent does not make a disclosure to a third 
parly (at 254-255). As an "alternative routc", the learned judge further 
submilled, with Rose L.J. again concurring, that an agent who commits a li-aud 
on his principal is not an agent for that purpose and section 19 is restricted to 
knowledge acquired by an agent to insure lJlIil agent ftH- the assured (at 256-
257)_ 
71 Prolldfoot, however, does not appear to be based on any implitation of the 
knowledge of the agenl 10 the assured; the principle is rather different, namely 
that both parties colltract on the basis thai all material facls - known to the 
assurcd or those which would have been known to the assured if Ihe agent 10 
whom he or she employed had comIllunicated the facts to the assured in the 
ordinary course of business - which ought in due course to have been made 
known to the insurer before the contract is effected have been disclosed". 
72 Por example, a director of a company in Regillil FlIr CompllllY Limited v. liossoll/ 
[1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 466 was in such a predominant position in respect of the 
company, given the scope of his operations and his abililY to direct the 
company's mimI amI will, that his knowledge could be imputed to the 
company. See also Am/; llilllk PLe v. Zurich lllstlmnce COlI/paIJ)' [1991'1 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 262 at 2R2. 
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in the ordinary course of matters of the suhject matter to be insured. 
Thirdly, there is a category of agent, the "agent to insure", who effects 
the relevant insurance for the assured. By virtue of section 19 of the 
Marine Insurance Act, \906, such agents to insure must disclose to the 
insurer every material circumstance known to the agent, who is deemed 
to know every circumstance that ought either to be known or to have 
been communicated to the agent, and also every material circumstance 
that the assured should disclose, unless discovered too late to be 
communicated to the agent. The section only encompasses those agents 
employed to effect the relevant insurance. An agent to insure, there/()re, 
owes the insurer a duty of disclosure quite distinct from the duty owed 
by the assured under section 18. Because the agent to insure is not 
employed to provide in/()rmation to the assured, the insurer is not 
entitled to contract on the basis of imputation of knowledge to the 
principal; to do so would be to render section 19 otiose. Rather the 
insurer contracts on the basis that the agent to insure, being someone so 
authorized to act, has disclosed all tilCts within that person's knowledge.73 
Indeed Lord Macnaghten gave the I(Jllowing explanation of an insurer's 
right to avoid in the event of non-disclosure by an agent to insure: "But 
that is not because the knowledge of the agent is to be imputed to the 
principal but because the agent of the assured is bound as the principal is 
bound to communicate to the underwriter all material tilcts within his 
I I I ,,7'1 mow el ge . 
To date in Ireland, there has been little or no polemicizing about the 
principal/agent nexus in the light of sections 18 and 19 of the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906; nor has there been any considered deliberation of 
the status of section 19 as viewed against the backdrop of section 18. 
Moreover, there has been no consideration of the Hampshire Land 
7J See Sociele AIWII),lIle d'illtcnlledilll'ies /'lIxelll/JOlIIgl'ois v. 1:lIrex (;ie 11,),)5J 
L.R.L.R. III>. 
7'1 1lI11,'UlllrII [ow (1111/ CO. I'. Vigors (1887) 12 App. Cas. 55 I at 542···543. In 
DelltsciJe lillchcrsiciJel"llllg A.C. v. Wei/brook ImllfCIlICC (,'0. !,td 11')')51 I W.L.R. 
1017, it was suggested - in u)ntrast to Lord Macnaghten's dictulll - that 
knowledge or tht' agent to insure could be imputed to the principal. This view, 
Illl\\'evn, was rejected ill Societe AIIOII),/I/[' "'IIlICrtllcdillries i.llxl'lIl/lOlIrgcois v. 
hllt'x (;it' II '),)5J UtI .. R. 116 on the basis that it would render section 19 
otiost'. See also Iknnett, I I. N. Mapping the dodrine of utlllost good f~lith in 
insurance contract law. Lloyd", Marilillle IIlId COllllllenia/l.el\V (2l1CH"ler/)" Part 2, 
(1')<)<)).1'1'.165--222 at 171-176. 
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principle or the "alternative route" - submitted by Staughton L.J. in 
PCW SY/ldicates to the etfect that section 19 is restricted to knowledge 
acquired by the agent to insure (PW agent for the assured - as it relates to 
fraud or misconduct committed by an agent against his or her principal. 
This vacuum is largely attributable to the lack of case-law arising in this 
jurisdiction; what cases do exist, however, pay laconic attention to the 
questions in issue. 
In Chariot [/IllS Ud v. Assicllrilziolli Generali S.P.A. mill Coyle 
Hallliltoll, l/{//1/iltol1 Phillips Lilllite(r for example, the plaintiff company 
purchased a licensed premises at Ranelagh in Dublin. The directors and 
shareholders of the company were a M r. and Mrs. W oolton. The 
directors took the decision to run the premises as a public-house and also 
to provide cabaret entertainment. This made it necessary to build a large 
room at the back. There were furnishings in the existing building; as the 
extension could not be completeted without removing them, a decision 
was made to store them at No. 82 Lower Leeson Street, Dublin. These 
premises were owned by consolidated Investment Holdings Limited, 
whose shares had been purchased by a Mr. Woolton and a Mr. Mockler, 
but had been registered in the maiden names of their wives. The 
defendant insurance brokers placed the insurance of their Leeson Street 
premises with Sun Alliance and London Insurance C;roup. The Leeson 
Street premises and furnishings of the plaintiff company - which 
Consolidated Investment Limited held as bailees - were badly damaged 
in a fire. The insurers of that building paid an agreed sum to 
Consolidated Investment pursuant to the policy obtained by the 
company: the agreed sum included £8,000 in respect of the plaintiffs 
fu rn j t u reo 
In respect of the Ranelagh premises, the plaintiff wanted cover against 
fire risk, employer's liability, liability to the public and loss or profits. 
Separate proposal forms for each type of insurance were sent by the 
defendant insurers to the defendant brokers. During a meeting between a 
Mr. Harte of Coyle Hamilton brokers (the agents to insure) and the 
plaintiff, there was a discussion about the fire at the Leeson Street 
premises. Mr. Harte informed the plaintiffs that it was totally 
unnecessary to disclose this information on the proposal form because 
"we were dealing with a separate company and only had to show what 
75 11981]I.R. 199. 
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was relevant to the Chariot InIl".76 In the proposal liJrJll the 1(>lIowing 
statement appeared: "Give claims experience for loss over the last live 
years (i.e., date, nature of loss, amollnt paid, or outstanding). If none in 
any claim, say so". The answer written by Mr. Harte was "none". The 
plaintiff director warranted expressly that the statements made in the 
proposal 1(>rIll were true and complete. In May 1978, a serious lire 
occurred at the plaintiffs Ranelagh premises. In June 1978, the defendant 
insurers repudiated liability because of the non-disclosure of the li.re at 
the Leeson Street premises. The plaintiffs claimed in the High Court, as 
against the defeIldant insurer, a declaration that at all material times the 
policy issued by the defendant insurer in respect of the Ranelagh 
premises was a valid policy of insurance. The plaintiffs also claimed 
damages from the defendant insurance broker for negligence and breach 
of contract. 
In the High Court, Keane J. held that since the plaintiffs had not 
obtained insurance fi.H damage to its furniture caused by the fire at the 
Leeson Street building and had not claimed against any insurance 
company in respect of that damage (the insurance of these premises was 
effected, and the claim was presented, by Consolidated Investment 
Limited), the statement in the proposal form was accurate am! there had 
been no breach of warranty.77 Nevertheless, the plaintiff assureds still 
owed to the defendant insurer a common law duty to disclose, prior to 
acceptance of the risk by the defendant insurer, every material 
circumstance which would innuence the judgment of a prudent insurer 
in tlxing the premium or in determining whether or not to take the ~isk 
involved. In confining the determination of this matter to the pOSSIble 
existence of a moral hazard?~ the trial judge concluded that non-
disclosure of the lIre at the Leeson Street premises did not constitute a 
material fact which the plaintiffs were bound to disclose?'> As a result, the 







11".1 at 229. 
[/,i.l at 2116. , . 1 f tl 
The learned judge believed there was no question 01 th~ physIG' n'~ture 0") Ie 
risk being ,1Ilecled by the circumstances of the l.eeson Street hre: IIJIt!:I~ .~15. 
This cOlldusioll was arrived at desplle the unaIlll110US view olt,he thlee experts 
Oil insurallce business who gave evidence to the clfeet that the !Ire ."tthe Leeson 
Stred prcmises and the d,unage to the plaintiffs' goods were m'ltenalto the mk. 
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1)] the Supreme Court, however, this decision was reversed. Kenny J., 
with Henchy J. and Griffin J. concurring, held that the "circumstances in 
which the goods were stored in the Leeson Street premises and the fact 
that the plaintiffs ultimately got payment in respect of them were, in my 
view, matters which would reasonably have affected the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in deciding whether to take the risle or in fixing the 
premium, particularly as Mr. Wootton was a director of: and managed 
and controled the plaintiff company and Consolidated Investment".80 
The insurer was accordingly entitled to avoid the policy of insurance. In 
respect of the liability of the insurance brokers, it was held: "An 
insurance broker owes a contractual duty to his client to possess the skill 
and knowledge which he holds himself out to the public as having, and to 
exercise this in doing the client's business. He is also liable in tort if he 
/;Iils to exercise that skill and knowledge. Mr. Harte ... should have 
known that the fire at Leeson Street and the subsequent payment of 
£'8,000 to the plaintiffs were material to the risk which the defendant 
insurers were being requested to undertake".HI What is curious about he 
decision is that although the insurers were entitled to avoid the contract 
on the basis of non-disclosure of a material fact, no attempt was made to 
examine this non-disclosure in the light of section 1982 (or indeed section 
80 1198111.R. 199 at 231. 
81 J/Jicl at 231~232. The question of contributory negligence Oil the part of the 
plaintiffs was raised by counsel fill' the brokers but this contention was 
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely onlhc skill and 
judgment of the broker who acted as their professional adviser. 
82 III respect of the duties of an agent of the insurer in tilling oul a proposal form, 
see JO/III /3 Fllrrell v. SOllth nllst LIIIICllshire [1IS1Ircl1ICC COIIII'II/IY l.td [1933] IR 36 
at 4<1 where it was held that the clerk of an insurance broker who filled in a 
proposal tllrlll for the proposer was not acting on behalf of the defendant 
insurance company or of the insurance broker but in the character of a "mere 
amanucnsis", "as a friend of the proposer". Once the proposer signed the basis 
of contract clause, and a statement in the proposal form was proven to be 
untrue, the defendant insurers had the right to avoid the policy. See also Tllylor 
1'. Yorkshire [IISllralice COllipallY [19131 2 I.lt I at 17 where an insurance 
intermediary was taken to be an agent of the assured in filling up answers in a 
proposal form. Quoting Mr. Justice Wright in Biggar v. Rock Life ASSlIrlllICe 
COIII/,IIII), 119021 I K.B. 516, Palles CB. noted: "Although 'he [the agent] may 
have been an agent 10 put the allSwers in form', the agent of an insurance 
company cannot be treated as their agent to invent Ihe answers to the questiQns 
ion the proposal form; and Ihal, if he is allowed by the proposer to invent the 
,1IlS1VtrS, and to send them as the answers of the proposer, the agenl is, 10 that 
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18) of the Marine Insurance Act of I Y06, and, in particlllar the fule that 
an agent, must disclose facts known to him or her, whether Of not also 
known to the assured.H3 
More recently, in InlemMiollai COl1lmercial Halik PLC v. IIiSllmllce 
COlpomtioll of Ireland })1,C and Meadows Indemllity COllljJany L/d ll4 the 
plaintiff bank agreed to lend to a company known as Amaxa S.A. a sum 
of 11.5 million Swiss Francs by virtue of a loan agreement entered into 
between the parties on February 9, 1984. On the same date, the defendant 
insurers, in consideration of the bank making the loan to Amaxa, 
undertook to indemnify the bank ft)r tOO percent of the amount o[ the 
loan. This indemnity was granted to the bank by the defendant insurers 
by way of a credit guarantee insurance agreement in writing for a period 
of seven years, subject to the payment of an annual premium by Amaxa. 
The bank lent the money to Amaxa pursuant to the loan agreement and 
when the company del~lldted on the loan in 1987, the bank called on the 
defendants to pay the slim due. II was contended on behalf of the 
defendant insurer that the credit guarantee insurance agreement was a 
contract of insurance -- and not of guarantee - and so a contract 
lIverrill/lle fidei. It was arglled that the bank had a duty to disclose and 
had tliled to disclose to the insurer all facts material to the risk, namely, 
that the purpose of the loan was to acquire a 100 percent interest in a 
hotel ill Creece. It was doubtful in Greek law, as it applied to foreign 
companies owning land, if the loan could be applied [or the stated 
purpose. It was contended by lei, the defendant insurers, that this was a 
l~lct which the bank knew - the t:1ct was known by the brokers (Leslie and 
C;odwin) who initially acted for Amaxa, but also It)r the bank, it was 
t"Xll"lIt, the <It\Cllt, not of the imurallu: company, but of the proposer." Section 
5 \ of the InslIr"lIct" Alt, 1 'iH'i, now provides, howevn, that an insurance agent 
slull be dCL'med to be ,l(tint\ dS the ilt\ent of the undertaking to whom a proposal 
of illsur,llIle is beint\ made whell, I'll" the purpose of the formation of the 
insur.IIILL· u1ntr,l(t, he or she (ompktes, or hdps the proposer cOIllplete, it 
propos.1I for insurance. 
tU As pn 1'( 'IV SYlltli!tlft's I'. PCW 1~"ill'lIrcrs ! 19961 1 Lloyd's Rep. 241 at 25H, it is 
sllbmitted th.lt seltioll 19 is comprised of three ruks: (1) The agent is bound to 
disc"iose what the assured knows, unkss it comes to the assured's attention too 
1.1lt' for ,"llllnlllniratilln to the "gent; (2) the agent must disclose facl~ known to 
"illl or her, whethcr or not also known to the assured; (J) the agent also has ,\ 
dllt)' to disclosc l'ICIS which in the ordinary course of business he or she should 
h.lve known, whether or not within the knowledge of the assured. 
K·' il<J<JIII.l.IUvl, 726 
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argued, when it obtained the insurance. The submissions made on behalf 
of the plaintiff were that the contract between the plainliff and the 
defendant was one of guarantee; secondly, that even if the contract was 
one of insurance, the brokers who had procured the defendant's 
involvement had not acted as agents to insure for the bank - ergo, the 
plaintiff could not have been affected by non-disclosure on their part. 
In the High Court, Blayney J. held that the contract entered into 
between the plaintiff and the defendant was not one which required 
IIberrilll(Je fides on the part of the bank and was in substance a guarantee 
rather than a contract of insurance; this was sufficient to determine the 
plaintiffs claim against the defendant. Blayney J., however, went on to 
suggest o/Jiter that even if he had come to the determination that the 
agreement was a contract of insurance, the defendant insurer's claim 
would still have failed for two reasons. First, the insurance was not 
procured on behalf of the bank but on behalf of Amaxa. 85 Secondly, and 
even if the brokers were acting on behalf of the bank, material 
circumstances known to the agent effecting the insurance were still not 
disdosahle, according (0 the learned judge, unless knowledge of them 
. I' I' I . t' I I H6 I was acqUlre( JI1 lIS or ler capaCIty as agent or (le assure(. n 
proposing the latter reason, Blayney J. cited paragraph 811 or the seventh 
edition of MacGillivray alld Parkilltoll all Illsurallce Law as being the 
correct law: "It is not all knowledge in the possession of an agent to effect 
an insurance which is imputed to and effects the assured, but only that 
which the agent acquired in the course of his agency while preparing to 
effect the particular insurance, so that the assured would not he deemed 
to know things which the agent had heard about earlier in connection 
with other insurances"H7 (my emphasis). This decision as it applies to 
"agents to insure" is interesting for three reasons. First, no reference was 
made in the text of the judgment to section 19 of the Marine Insurance 
Act, 1906, thereby fmther contributing to its nebulous status. Secondly, 
and though obiter, in adopting MacGillivray, Blayney J. appears to view 
as correct the proposition that knowledge of an agent (0 insure can be 
85 Ibid a( 740. 
86 Even iC ex hyputhe,i, l. ... slie and (;odwin were (he bank's agents to insure, they 
could only h'lve hecome so alkr (he January 23, 1984. There was no evidence 
that knowledge of the problem of a I()reign company purchasing Creek land was 
acqllired by the broker's after this dale. 
H7 11LJ911I.LR.M. 726 a( 740. 
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imputed to the assured. If one proceeds with this view as a correct 
proposition of law, this raises interesting questions about the status and 
utility of section 19, particularly as it relates to section IS, of the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906. Thirdly, the proposition in MilcGillil'my that 
material circumstances known to the agent effecting the insurance are 
not disclosable unless knowledge of them was acquired in his or her 
capacity as agent for assured appears to be at variance with recent dicta in 
England and Wales. In El Ajoll v. Dollar Llllld Ho/dillgs pre alld I11lotherH8 
Hoftillan L.J. noted: "an insurance policy may be avoided on account of 
the broker's fililure to disclose material facts within his knowledge, evell 
though he did not o/ltaill tllilt kllowledge ill his capacity (/5 agellt filr the 
insured". Similarly, in Societe AllonYllle d'Illtemlediaries LlIxelll/lolirgeois 
v. PC/rex Gies') the same judge offered the following proposition in respect 
of the obligation to disclose under section 19: "The insured and his agent 
are under a duty to disclose every material circumstance of which they 
have knowledge, irrespective of the wily ill which thllt kllow/edge WIlS 
. /,,'ill ( I' ) M' I I f' .. I' IIUllllret. my emp 1aSIS. ore Important y per 1aps rom a )UrlS( IC-
tional vista, the proposition also appears to be at variance with the o/liter 
dictlllll of Cibson J. in '/'lly/or v. '['he Yorkshire IIlSlIrance COlllpallY 
Lilllitctt l - a pre-1922 Irish case not referred to by Blayney J. - where it 
was stated: "Sections 19 and 20 [Marine Insurance Act, 19061 deal with 
knowledge of the assured's (not the insurer's agent) agent, in 'marine 
insurance usually a broker, whose knowledge, from his position, would 
be understood by the parties to be applicable to the particular 
insurance, I hough il III igh I lill ve beell (lei/II i ret! bejc)re the tlcillil! COil t met . .. 
Where a broker is employed - whether in marine insurance or otherwise 
- the principal may be alrected by knowledge which the nature of the 
broker's business would naturally enable the latter to possess, but in all 
such cases the notice is closely collllccted in point of time with the 
ilK [ I ')<)·tl 2 All IUt 6Wi al 702. 
K9 [1<)9:'] I.IU.R 116 ,It 1,19. 
9() These did a are abo at odds with the "alternative rOllte" pmited by Stallghtoll 
1.1. ill PCWSYllrii((lles. 
91 11')1.\] 2 l.lt 1 at .ll··.n . 
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particular contract: ntackbllrll 1'. Vigors; HlIICkll11m 1'. IIIlSlllll/." (my 
emphasis).92 
In summation, a number of delphic issues require closer exploration 
regarding what an assured must disclose to an insurer in Irish law. First, 
the Irish courts need to revisit the tenebrous proposition that insurers 
may stipulate for any warranty they please, particularly in the light of the 
formalistic approach adopted in Keenall, and the introduction of the 
Irish Federation Codes of Practice, 1992, and the European Communities 
(Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995. Secondly, in 
Keatillg, McCarthy J. appeared to indicate in his judgment that an 
assured's ignorance or obtuseness about material facts would constitute a 
defence to non-disclosure. Though, in part, the proposition may 
potentially be of signillcance in balancing up the dyadic relationship 
between the insurer and the assured viS-II-vis the duty of disclosure, 
further judicial deliberation is required before any discussion of its merits 
can commence. In particular, McCarthy J.'s obiter statement appears too 
sweeping in scope and traverses, without punctilious consideration, 
strong persuasive authorities to the contrary - as noted, it is long 
established in England and Wales that it is not a defence fi)r an assured to 
claim that a fact was not disclosed on the basis of forgetfulness. Aside 
from its external ramifications, the proposition itself is question-begging. 
\"'hen, for example, does ignorance or obt lIseness cease and willful 
ignorance and the suppression of information commence? Will such a 
determination be objective or subjective? Will the standard required be 
lower in respect of consumer assureds? Thirdly, in the same case, an 
92 (;ibson J. appears to be drawing a distinction between information received by 
an agent to insure I'lr the assured where knowledge can be acquired bef'lre the 
actual contract (though <lily previous knowledge which might be carried 
forward into the contract period should be closely connected with the contract) 
and information received by an agent to insure for the insurer in which case the 
I(lllowing principle applies: "[A]ntecedent knowledge obt<lined bel,)re the 
agency, or casual inlilrillation detached li'olll the contract, cannot be imputed. 
This appears to be now the received view of the profession as appears from the 
test wrilers such as Evans on Principal and Agent (where the law is well 
summarized); Bowstead; and Lord TJasbury's I.aws of England." f/lid. at 31. In 
lilllcklJllrll, Low lIlId Co. v. Vigors, as cited by Gibson J., Lord Watson Slated: 
"when an agent to insure is brought in to contract with an insurer, the laller 
transacts on the footing that the agent has disclosed every material circumstance 
within his /lrrSOllll/ kllow/edge, whether it be known to his principar or not". 
(lHIP) 12 API'. Cas. 5.\ 1 at 541. 
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opportunity was presented to the Supreme Court to examine the law as 
regards inferences that could be drawn from primary t~lcls. The lack of 
considered analysis, however, resulted in the loss of the chance to 
proselytize about the threshold required as regards inferences that could 
be drawn from the primary knowledge of consumers. Fourthly, as 
regards material t~lcts which ought to be disclosed in the ordinary course 
of business, the Irish courts have not been afforded the opportunity to 
determine whether the Arnould or Clarke test applies ~ the former 
proposition, for the reasons stated, it is submitted, should be adopted if 
the opportunity presents itself to the Irish courts. Finally, there has been 
little or no deliberation by the Irish courts of the principal/agentnexlIs in 
the light of sections 18 and 19 of the Marine I nsurance Act, 1906, even 
where, on occasion, the pertinent issues offered such an opening. What 
statements are in evidence, it is submitted, create rather than dissipate 
such uncertainty. If, for example, one accepts that knowledge of an agent 
to insure can be imputed to the principal, what status should be given to 
section 19 of the Act.YJ Moreover, there are currently two antithetical 
views of when knowledge of an agent to insure is disclosable: first, it has 
been submitted that it is disclosable if it is acquired by the agent in his or 
her capacity for the assured, as per the obiter dietl/Ill of Blayney J. in 
illtematiOllill COllllllercill/13llllk, and, secondly, it has been submilled that 
it is disciosable if the knowledge that was acquired is closely connected 
with the particular contract, as per (;ibson J. in Faylor, a pre-1922 
decision in Ireland. 
PREVIOUS CRIMINAL INPORMATION 
III respect of the duty to disclose previous criminal in/(Jrmation, the 
law in Ireland, particularly as it relates to adults, remains unsettled. 
Fxcluding the fact that petty old convictions of 20 years standing need 
not ht' recounted, which in part amounts to judicial incorporation of lhe 
reasoning hehind the ({t'hahilitation of Offenders Act in the UK, that 
l).1 In Fngl.lnd and W.d~s, se~ I'L'W SYlidict/tes 1'. }Jew Reillsllrers 11996: I Lloyd's 
Rep. 2·11 ,II 255 whnc Slaughlon I..J. nOled: "II is eSlablished Ihal seclion 19 
does nol prole~d by Ihe roule of impuling, allrihuling, deellling Ihe knowledge 
of Ihe .lgcnl 10 bc Ihe knowledge of Ihe principal." 
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what is material to disclose is that a crime has been commitled, and that 
offences committed before a person reaches 18 will become spent three 
years after a finding of guilt (with certain exceptions), little else can be 
proclaimed with certitude. In particular, there has been no deliberation 
on the need for a direct relationship between the offences committed and 
the risk posed, the stat us of moral hazard as it relates to previous 
criminal information, the need to disclose charges pending trial where 
the proposer is innocent of the charges, and the standing of criminal 
information as it relates to associates of the proposer. The purpose of this 
section is to Illap out the law as it relates to the disclosure of previous 
criminal information in Ireland, to highlight gaps that may produce 
coercive effects, and to suggest avenues of reform that may be taken to 
palliate such effects. 
In Am Road IIlId Lalld Vehicles v. The IlIsuralIce CorporatiolI of 
Irelmlli,<J4 a case which would not have reached the courts in England and 
Wales as a result of section of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, 
the Irish courts had to consider the doctrine relating to non-disclosure in 
the light of previous criminal wnvictions. In July 1981, the plaintiff 
company agreed to sell and deliver goods to a firm in Maize, Co. Antrim. 
At the request of the plaintiff~ the goods were to be delivered by CI.E. 
The goods were to be transported at the plaint ires own risk, and it was 
suggested by the carriers that the goods be insured. The carriers, acting as 
agents for the defendant insurance company, arranged insurance cover. 
The only information given to the plaintilf relating to the terms of the 
insurance was the extent of the cover; the only inlilrmation sought by the 
underwriters was the names and addresses of the consignor and 
consignee and the nature and value of the goods. No opportunity was 
given to the plaintiff to provide the defendant with additional 
information. The goods were to be delivered in four separate consign-
ments. Three arrived safely, but the fourth was hijacked, set on fire, and 
destroyed. The plaint ill issued proceedings seeking an indemnity under 
the policy for the loss. The defendant sought to repudiate liability on the 
basis that the plaintiff company had failed to disclose the fact that the 
managing director had been convicted on 10 counts of receiving stolen 
motor parts and sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment in 1962. 
-----------
94 [191'6) IX 403. 
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In the High Court, Carroll J., while personally of the opinion that the 
assured's non-disclosure was immaterial, deferred to the expert opinion 
given - which she considered transcended her own personal opinion -
which suggested that a reasonable and prudent underwriter would regard 
the matter of previolls convictions as material and would have regarded 
its non-disclosure as a good reason for reli.tsing to underwrite the risk. 
Accordingly, the learned judge held that the insurer was entitled to avoid 
the policy in question and to repudiate liability. In the Supreme Court, it 
was held that the trial judge, as sole and final arbiter, had erred in 
substituting the view of an underwriter for her own view in determining 
the question of what a reasonable underwriter was entitled to have 
disclosed: "111 n disputes concerning professional competence, a profes-
sion is not to be permitted to be the final arbiter of standards of 
competence. [n the instant case, the assurance profession is not to be 
permitted to dictate a binding definition of what is reasonable".95 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held illter alill - in an ethereal and 
unsettled attempt at incorporating the considerations which, in part, 
kindled the enactment of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974 in the 
UK -- that petty old convictions of almost 20 years standing may remain 
un revea /et\. \Jh 
The vagueness of approach in this decision, as it relates to the relevance 
of criminal information to the formation of insurance contracts, has 
left many questions unanswered. What, to begin with, of the need ti.lI" a 
nexus between the offences committed and the risk posed?'!? Even if 
'15 ibid at ·1·12 pcr I\IcCarthy J. The relevant principle had previously been stated by 
Kenny 1. in Chllriot illllS, a case which the trial judge in Am /lollt! relied upon -
though evidently only in relation to other issues - as part oj her judgment: "The 
stilndar" by which milteriality is to be deterl1lined is objective and not 
subjective. In the last resort the matter has to be determined by the court: the 
p.trties to the litigation may call experts in insurance l1Iatters as witnesses to give 
t'\'ideille 01 what they would have regarded 'IS material, but the question of 
materiality is not to be dell'rlllined by sllch matters." Chllriot illllS v . 
. ·\';sillll"llziolli C<"llcl"ll/i 1198 II I.It 19'1 at 225. Por the conclusiveness of expert 
testinwny in Ireland, see Kelliher, D. Expert evidence in Ireland. irish Low 
Fillle.' I·) (1996): 42-·45. In Fng\and and Wales, see also Reyllolds IlIlil Alldersoll 
I·. l'llOt·llix A.'SlIIWI«' Co. !.td tllld Others 11978J 2 Lloyd's I{cp. 440 at 457-458 
I't'I" Forhes J. 
% II'JH()ll.It 403 at 414. See also Ellis, II. Disclosure and good {,lith in insurance 
lontracts. Irish /1111' ·rill/cs, H (1990): 45-50 at 45. 
97 In FngJ.tnd and Wales, see Rosc/otige v. Castle 11'1661 2 Lloyd's Rep. It3 at Ll2. 
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there is no nexus bel ween a conviction for an offence and the risk posed, 
will the ofTence, or conviction for the olTence, nevertheless be material if it 
affects the moral hazard? In England and \t\laJes, some judicial support is 
palpable for the view that a conviction for an ofTence unrelated to the risk 
may be material if it falls under the rubric of moral hazarcl.~H More 
recently, support for the broadness of this view has been circumscribed. 
In Reynolds lIIui Alldersoll v. Phoenix ASSIIl'aIiCe Co. Utl,,,!9 for example, it 
was held that a conviction for receiving stolen goods was not material to a 
fire policy. Similarly in Deutsche RlIchersicherllllg 1'. Wallnook ]1/S/lrIlI1Ce 
( . 1 i 100 I I I" fl' . I . :l . A). ,1(, w lere t le p amtl relllsurers soug lt to aVOI( a contract, IIller 
oli(/, for non-disclosure on the grounds that the reinsured's agents acted 
fraudulently in misappropriating overriding commission that should 
have been credited to the reinsured, 10 1 Philipps J. held: "1 see the force of 
the argument that reinsurers are likely to be disinclined to accept risks 
from brokers or agents who have behaved dishonestly, bllt where the 
dishonest conduct has no impact on the risks being reinsured, 1 question 
whether it can entitle the reinsurers to avoid contracts placed by such 
brokers or agents on the grounds of non-disclosure. The doctrine of non-
disclosure is founded in equity. Avoidance in circulllstances such as those 
in this case is liable to have results that are inequitable."lo2 Abridging the 
pertinent propositions as they relate to the disclosure of previous 
convictions in England and Wales - propositions which should be of 
strong persuasive value in the Irish courts - it is submitted that the 
assured must disclose an offence, which involves a level of criminality 
which is antipathetic to standards of honesty and integrity and which 
have a direct connection to the risk posed, or, would by its constitution 
and temporal closeness (but excluding offences which fall within the 
9R Sec Cimlllllli )I. LOlldoll (;cllcml Illsurance Co. Ud (I935) 51 L.l.L R. 156; 
Woo/cott I'. SUIl AlIillllce and LOlldoll Illsurallce Co. Ud 1197R J I W.L.H.. 493. See 
also Clarke, 1'. The disclosure of criminal information to insurers. Uo)'ds 
MllritilllC IIlId COIII/llereilii 1.1111' QUllrterly (1984): 100-111 at 102. 
99 11978J 2 Lloyd's Rep. 440 at 460-46l. 
100 11995 J I !.loyd's Rep. 153 at 164. 
I () I Knowledge of this hIct, it was claimed, was imputed to each of the reiIlSureds by 
virtue of the fact that the directing minds of the agency were the directing 
minds of those reinsurance companies in relat ion to reinsurance. 
102 On the difficulties of accepting expert underwriter opinion on moral hazard, see 
It'SIlI"llIlCe COIl'oratiOlI of the Chllllllel Islllllds lind IIllother )I. ROYIlI Hotel Lilllited 
IIl1d Others 1199RJ Lloyd's Rep. lSI. • 
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ambit of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1,)74) to the proposed 
insurance reveal to an insurer, having regard to the natllre of the risk, the 
probability of recurring dishonest conduct by the assured. [OJ 
To date, the examination of previous criminal information has only 
focused on convictions for criminal offences. What of charges pending 
trial and association? In England and Wales, in lv1arch Cabaret v. LOlldoll 
Assurallce, [04 to the argument that an assured was only bound to disclose 
his arrest and committal for trial in keeping with his right to silence and 
privilege against self-incrimination, May J. noted: 
I was concerned at one stage in this case about how one could 
reconcile the presumption of innocence and the privilege of non-
incrimination with the duty of disclosure .... After argument I realize 
that my doubts were based upon a fallacy. One must remember that 
there is no estoppel by acquittal save as between the Crown and the 
person acquitted. There is nothing to prevent one party to civil 
proceedings, if the fact be material and relevant, attempting to prove 
that another party to those proceedings has in truth committed the 
crime of which that other party has been previously acquitted in a 
criminal court. ... Thus even if Ithe assured I had been acquitted prior 
to renewal ... there would ... have been nothing to prevent insurers 
attempting to prove that he had committed the offence. If they had 
succeeded and if I the assured I had, as here, t~liled to disclose that he 
had cOlllmitted the offences, then this would, notwithstanding his 
acquittal, have been a material non-disclosure entitling insurers to 
avoid the policy. No one has a right to a contract of insurance, and if a 
proposer has comlllitted a criminal o/Jence which is material and 
ought to be disclosed he Illust disclose it, despite the presulllption of 
innocence which is only a presumption, and despite the privilege of 
non-incrimination, which is only a privilege -- or he lllllst give lip the 
idea of obtaining insurance at al1. 105 
The learned judge went on to suggest: "There is one thing f would like to 
add; had it been material I would have been prepared to hold in this case 
that in an)' event ... Ithe assured I ought to have disclosed his arrest, 
ttl3 Sl't' ,\ [,/(( ,'illil,/"u)' "I'. cil. II. 51 at 412. 
I (J·I 1197') i I l.Ioyd's I{,,\,. 169. 
I (J') [bid.il 177. SCt' also [lIsl/rullce CorporalioJl of Ihe Chilllllcl {.I!il/lIl.l 1'. I~oyu! Hole! 
linlit".! ,nl.! ()tllt'r51199Ri Lloyd's Hep. 151. 
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charge and committal for trial at the date ofrenewaJ even though in truth 
he was innocent."lo6 In respect of this last submission, that a proposer 
for insurance ought to disclose the fact of his arrest, charge and 
committal for trial at the date of renewal, even though he was innocent of 
the charges, Forbes J. stated in /{cYlJolds ilIlii Anderso1l v. PiIoe1lix: 
With the greatest respect to Mr Justice May, I must decline to follow 
him in this suggestion. The object of requiring disclosure of 
circumstances which affect the moral risk is to discover whether the 
proposer is a person likely to be an additional risk from the point of 
view of insurance. The most relevant circumstance for disclosure is 
therefiJre that he actually committed an offence of a character which 
would in fact inl1uence the insurer's judgment. The proposer is bound 
to disclose the commission of that offence even though he has been 
acquitted or even if no one other than he has the slightest idea that he 
committed it: the material circumstance is the commission of the 
offence. A conviction for a criminal offence is itself, it seems to me, 
also material. .. even though the proposer may protest his innocence or 
in f:lct has not committed the offence; for a responsible insurer is 
himself entitled to assume that prilllo Jilcie the proposer was rightly 
convicted and has therefore in fact committed the offence. If therefore 
an allegation of a relevant criminalllffence is made and the allegation 
is true the proposer must disclose it not because the allegation has 
been made but because the offence has been committed; it is not then 
the allegation which must be disclosed but the underlying fact that a 
crime has been committed. lo7 
In Ireland in Derlllot Latliall! I'. liibcmiall IIlSlll'il/lce COII/pm1Y Ltd (/wl 
}'efer ]. Sheridlln lind COli/pliny Ulllited lOIl Blayney J., as discussed, 
approved broadly of Reynolds {//u/ Anderson 1'. Phoenix ASS1mlllce 
Compllny Lill/ited l/1/(l Others: "In that case iReynolds and Anderson] 
it was held that the material circumstance was not the fact that a party 
had been charged with an offence, but that he had committed the 
offence. What had to be disclosed was the underlying f~lCt that a crime 
had been committed." Interestingly, in the English case of IIII'C1'siones 
](16 (1975) I I.Ioyd's Rep. 169 at 177. 
107 [1971lj 2 Lloyd's Rep. 440 at 460. For sllpport for rorbes }.'s position, see the 
judgment of Fisher J. in the lIigh Court in New Zealand in Gille v. SIIII Al/ic/llCC 
IlIslIre/nee 1-111 [199~) LRLR 385. 
lOR Unreported, Iligh Court, March 22, 1991, at p. 7. 
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M(l1lriu S.A. v. Sphere Dmke Illsurallce co. Pic (Tile !)(Jrll),1()9 Philipps J. 
submitted obiter that he preferred the reasoning of !\\ay J. in March to 
that of Forbes J. in neYllolds and, accordingly, charges of smuggling, 
whether or not they were well founded, should have been disclosed. IIo 
Given the broadness of application of Neyl/olds in Ireland, it is unclear 
whether the proposer for insurance must disclose his or her arrest, charge 
and committal for trial even if the allegations are unfounded, or, only if 
the offence has been committed. It is submitted that the former 
proposition is anomalous and casts the net too widely. Moreover, and as 
regards England and Wales, the proposition is inconsistent with the telos 
of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974: applying such a proposition, 
a proposer for insurance could, ex hypothesi, have to disclose spurious 
and baseless allegations but would be excused from having to disclose a 
spent conviction "of comparatively recent dale" under the 1974 Act. 
Accordingly, the latter proposition is to be preferred. I I I Syllogistically 
assimilating these variolls points, the law as il currently endures requires, 
or should require, a proposer for insurance to disclose the t1ctS of an 
arrest, charge or committal for trial for an offence -- where the offence 
has been committed - and, it appears, the commission of an olTence for 
which the proposer was acquitted or which remains undetected at the 
time of proposing the risk. 
Finally, not only are an applicant's own convictions capable of being 
construed as material, so too are those of persons with whom he or she 
associates l12 - though presumably there should be a nexlis between the 
offences and the risk insured against or would indicate a likelihood of 
continuing dishonest), as it related to the risk. Although there is 110 
authority precisely to this effect, such a proposition also applies, 1IIlIiatis 
/Illllawlis, to other kinds of criminal information as it relates to associates 
of the assured including arrest, charge, and committal for trial (where 
well founded) and where the offence has been committed but which 
I ()9 119K91 I lloyd',; Rcp. 69 al In ·94. 
110 St'L' ,lIso C1,lIke, 01'. cit. n. 9~ al I ()4. 
III Blit SL'C the diLium of Colinan J. in Ti,e Moollllcre: "if Ihe proposer is in 
IHlssession of informalion which, iC Irlle, wOlild he malerial to Ihe risk and he 
Llils 10 disclose ii, Ihe insurer will he enlilled 10 avoid Ihe policy even if Ihe 
illt(>rIll,lIioll ill Ihe possession of Ihe assured is suhsequenlly fOllnd 10 have been 
ullllpll'lL'iy IIlllrlle". 119921 2 Lloyd's Rep 501 al 521. 
112 1,/lII/}"/I I'. Cool' /IISlIrtlIlCC Society !.ttl 119751 2 Uoyd's l{cp. 4~5. 
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remains undetected or in respect of which the associate has been 
acquitted. The issue of association as it relates to previous criminal 
information has never been dealt with by the Irish courts. The 
opportunity did however present itself in Lalllill1l but Blayney J. declined 
to deliberate on the matter. As noted, the plaintiff and Oliver Byrne 
obtained a 35 year old lease for a property in Dublin in May 1983 and 
opened a 24 hour grocery shop. Insurance cover was obtained from 
Hibernian Insurance Company, initially in the names of the plaintiff and 
Oliver Byrne. Before the policy was renewed in August 1984, it was 
completed in the plaintiff's own name. The material facts were that the 
plaintiff had on November 22, 1983 committed an offence of receiving 
stolen goods -- and had admitted doing so - which ought to have heen 
disclosed at renewal. Similarly Oliver Byrne had been arrested and 
charged with the same offence at the same time as the plaintiff. 
Moreover, it was adduced in evidence that even though Oliver Byrne was 
not a party to the renewal of the insurance policy, he had a private 
arrangement with the plaintiff under which he would receive 50 percent 
of allY claim which was recovered from the insurer. The case was decided 
on the basis that the plaintiff had t~liled to disclose that he had 
committed the relevant offence and had admitted it. The question it hegs, 
however, is whether or not the plaintiffs association with Byrne, as it 
related to the property in question, and the fact of the latter's arrest and 
charge for the same offence, was also a material fact which ought to he 
disclosed. Presumably such a fact would be material provided there was 
some form of continued association in respect of the insured property. I U 
As noted, no reference was made to the issue in the judgment. Indeed the 
prestrictioll of the judgment as it relates to previous criminal 
inf<)J"Jl1ation is heightened by the fact that Blayney J., in response to a 
submission hy coullsel [or the plaintiff that the mere charge and arrest of 
the plaintiff was not a material fact which ought to be disclosed, 
suggested as follows: "it is not necessary in the circUIllstances to consider 
another issue which was raised ill the course of the argument, namely, 
whether the mere charge and arrest of the plaintiff was a material filet 
ILl On this point, it should be noted llwt Oliver Hyrne was joined as a plaintifC 
along wit h Llthalll, in the claim against the defendant brokers fDr negligence 
and breach of contract. Sec Dermol /"lIlhll1l1 v. /-Ii/Jemillll //lSl/nIllCC COli/pOllY 
Limited (I11t1 Peter J. Sheridall alit! ComjJllllY Umitcd. Unreported, Iligh Court, 
December 4, 1991, per Blayney J. 
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which ought to have been disclosed. It was part of the plaintiffs 
submission that it was not. Since it is not necessary to consider the issue I 
make no finding in respect of it. t t~ Given that the learned trial judge 
approved of UeYlloltis alld Allderso/l as it related to the disclosure of the 
fact of having committed an offence - as opposed to having been charged 
with an offence - it would not be difficult to refine the principle further, 
in a manner consistent with Reynolds alld AlldersoN, by suggesting that a 
charge and arrest would slriclro sellSII be material if, and only if, the 
assured knew them to be well-foundecl. 
The law as it relates to disclosure of criminal in/l>rInation by adults in 
Ireland is latently coercive by virtue of its ambiguity. Beyond the bct that 
petty old convictions of 20 years standing need not be recounted, and 
that what is material to disclose is that a crime has been committed, little 
else can be expressed apodictically. Within sllch a broad and potentially 
oppressive net there remains a vast grey a rea of undetermi ned issues. 
These include whether or not there is a requirement of a nexus between 
offences commit ted and the risk posed (and if so the threshold of proof 
ill respect of the establishment of such a nexus); the status of criminal 
in/lJrtllation l'is-il-vis the Illoral hazard; the circumstances in which a 
proposer Ill!· insurance will be required to disclose his or her arrest, 
charge and committal for trial; whether or not a proposer will be obliged 
to disclose ofTences which remain undetected or /l)r which he or she has 
been acquitted, and; the standing of previous criminal information as it 
relates to associates of the proposer. What is perhaps most striking about 
Irish law as regards previous criminal in/()J·mation in respect of adults is 
the lack of expungement provisions - this exacerbates current ambiguity 
in the common law reallll. Indeed, every Ell country, with the exception 
of Ireland, makes available some form of spent conviction scheme as 
regards a person's criminal record. t t5 In England and Wales, for 
example, sedion --1(3)(a) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act \074 
provides that an applicant /ll!" insurance is never bound to disclose a 
COI1VtdlOn which has become spent under the terms of the Act. This 
legislation has however been the subject of criticism and is under 
I 1·( 1)(",.,11"( I.<IT/lil/II 1'. ili[,crni<ll/ [1IS1/rolle/! COIIIPIiI/)' Lillli(ed II/Ill Peter I. S/,,:ridllll 
<llIeI (""IIIi'<III), I.illlited Unreported, lligh COllrt, March 22, 1991 al pp. 9--10. 
II') Sl't" NIACI{O. licgll/<ltillg the rcl/oll' Ticket. 19<)6. Prinl 'n Press Ltd, Belfast. 
3'16 
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review. I 16 For example, under the current Act, a sentence of imprison-
ment of more than 30 months can never be expunged. Moreover, section 
7(3) of the Act gives the Court a discretion to admit evidence as to 
previous criminal convictions which fall within the ambit of the 
legislation in circumstances where it is satisfied that "justice cannot be 
done in the case except by admitting or requiring evidence relating to a 
person's spent convictions".II? Though the provisions in the United 
Kingdom are currently quite restrictive, particularly as they relate to 
sentences of more than 30 months, reform in Ireland - by way of further 
judicial incorporation or, more appropriately, statutory enactment -
along the lines of a careful consideration of the review group's 
recommendations in the UK, when published, would at least provide a 
reference point, a source of empowerment, for adults with previous 
criminal information in this country. Such reftHm would, even at 
baseline level, offer the potential to alleviate some of the harshness 
created by the current anomalous state of the law in this country.IIS 
FACTS WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSURER 
The purpose of this final section is to outline the law as it relates to 
facts which are known or presumed to be known to the insurer. 
SpecifIcally, it will allempt to examine issues such as the insurer's means 
of ascertaining infiJrll1ation, whether or not such means will apply 
equally to trade practices and events and acts which affect trade practices, 
116 See Broadhead, J. Denying the Past. New 1.11\1' foI/rllilI, 151(700») (2001): 
p.I)66. 
117 See also Better regulation task f(lIu" Review of Fit PersolJs Criterill. 1999 
Stationery Office, London, p. 24 where it was suggested that the rehabilitation 
periods which determine when certain types of convictions become spent "have 
arisen more from political expediency than any rational justification". 
118 Some amelioration has already occurred in respect of persons under 18. Section 
258 of the Children Act, 2001, provides that where such a person has been 
found guilty of an offence (and it is an offence not required to be tried be/(ne 
the Central Criminal Court), and a period of three years has elapsed since the 
finding of guilt (and the person has not been dealt with f(lI> any other offence in 
the three year period), he or she shall be treated "for all purposes in law as a 
person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or found 
guilty of or dealt with for the offence or offences which are the subject of the 
finding of guilt". . 
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the impact of an assured's false representations on the presumption of 
knowledge of an insurer, the status of conjecture or rUJllor, and when the 
acquisition of the knowledge of an agent of the insurer must occur in 
order to impact on the insurer. 
Section 18(3)(b) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 provides that in 
the absence of enquiry any circumstance which is known or presumed to 
be known to an insurer need not be disclosed. As Lord Mansfield noted 
in respect of the actual knowledge of an insurer in Cllrler v. Hoell/II: tt9 
"There are many maHers, as to which the insured may be innocently 
silent - he need not mention what the underwriter knows - ScieJIti{/ 
lItrillijl/C par pares cOlltmhentes facit. An underwriter cannot insist that 
the policy is void, because the insured did not tell him what he actually 
knew; what way soever he came to the knowledge." The principle applies 
where knowledge is received by an agent of the insurer, provided it was 
received in the ordinary course of his or her duty.120 In respect of 
presumed or constructive knowledge, it has been suggested: "The insured 
need not mention what the underwriter ought to know ... He needs not 
be told general topics of speculation: as for instance - The underwriter is 
bound to know every cause which may occasion natural perils; as the 
diniclllty of a voyage - the kind of seasons- the probability of lightning, 
hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. He is hound to know every cause which may 
occasion political perils; froll1 the ruptures of the States /i-om war, and 
the various operations of it. lie is bound to know the probability of 
Ill) (1766).\ Burr 1l)05 al 1910. See also the diclulll of Cockburn c.]. in fillies v. 
/lcII'itt (IH67) Lit 2 (2.l\. 595 al 6IH·60S: "It is true, if malters are collllllon 10 
the knowledge of both p,\rlies, s\lch m,\(krs need no( be communicated ... If, 
indt'ed, the insurer knows the tac(, the omission on (iIe pari of (iIe assured (0 
COIlln\lInic.\tc it will not ,tvail ,IS a deknee in all actioll [(lr loss; not because the 
,\ssurt·d will have LOJllplinl wilh the ohligations which rested on hill\ to 
COllllllllllicatc Ihat which was maleria/' hut because it will not lie ill Ihe mouth 
of the ullderwrikr to sal Ihal .\ Illaterial ti\CI was nol COllllll\lllicaleu to him, 
which hl· had present to his mind at the tillle he accepted the illSurance; the law 
will lwi lend itsdf to a defence based upon fraud; it will not allow the 
ulHlcnniter 10 S'\\" 'I have taken the premium with the knowledge of Ihe 
p,trtindar f'It"!, but bec,lllSe the assured has not commllniu\ted it to me I will 
llol Ill,tk,· good Ihe loss'. Therefore, if the filet he knowll to the ullderwriter, he 
ldllnot av,lil hilllst:lf of the circulllslance that it was not cOlllnl\lnicated hy the 
,ISSllrl·d; but pUlling Ihat aside, it is Ihe duty of Ihe assured to make knowil to 
Ihl' imurcr wh,\tever is material wilh reg"rd to the extent of the risk." 
t211 ['itllll/ I'. i<"II'is (IH<>2) :>. F & F 77'1'" 
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safety, hom the continuance or return of peace; from the imbecility of 
the enemy, through the weakness of their counsels, or their want of 
I ,,12t I f} I '1·' b 121 {" I' I I J I I strengt 1, etc. n rO ey 1'. il or, ~ or examp e, It was 1e II t 1at actua 
knowledge was not essential if the insurer hall the means of knowing the 
fact in question. Applying Foley in Irebnd, Davitt P. held in Krelinger n/ld 
FC1'/Iill/ Lilllited v. Irish NiltiollllllllSl/rallCC Compally Lillliteti: l 2.1 
Insurance companies must surely be presllmed to have some 
knowledge of the trade and business of the persons whose contracts 
they cover. .. While the duty to make full disclosure of all matters 
material to the risk rests upon the insured, and it does not tall to the 
insurer to relieve him of that duty hy making inquiries, the converse is 
to this extent true, that the insured does not have to conduct the 
insurer's business for him. Where the contract, the performance of 
which the insurer is asked to cover, contains a clear intimation that a 
matter which is specifically referred to but not fully set out, is of 
importance, and full information is to be had for the asking, it would 
seem quite unreasonable and unjust to allow the insurer to repudiate 
liability on the grounds [hat he did not know and was not told the 
details of something which he was in fact told about. 
This point in Krelillger that a clear intimation of a matter by an assured, 
though not fully set out, may prevent an insurer from repudiating 
liability raises interesting questions about the Keating case, as 
discussed. 124 James Keating had informed the defendant insurer's 
medical examiner on May 28, J 985 (two weeks before the life policy 
was executed) that he spent two days with Dr. Geraghty (SiC)125 in Baggot 
Street HospitaL He also disclosed the name of his own C;.P. Though 
conjectural, it is submitted that it could have been argued that the 
assured had given a clear intimation of the matter in question and, 
accordingly, it would be unreasonable and unjust to allow the insurer to 
12\ C{/rter v. Boehm (\766) .> Burr 1905 at 1910. 
122 (\ R(1) 2 F & F 6td at 762. As Erie c.J, noted: "Actual knowledge is not essential 
if the insurer knew he had the means of knowing the l~lct and it was within his 
knowledge. Ie for example, he knew he could learn the exact cargo 1 of a ship 1 at 
Lloyd's IShipping Iisl], and chose nol to ascertain il ... , il was within his 
knowledge." 
123 119561 l.lZ. \16 at 150-\51. 
124 See Silpm n. 18. 
125 It was actually Dr. (;earty: it is not clear whether lhe medical examiner look this 
down incorrectly or if it was staled incorrectly by the assured. ' 
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repudiate liability on the grounds that it was not disclosed. In other 
words, the assured had put the insurer in a position to obtain the 
inli.mnation, but that the insurer had not taken the "further step" and 
must be taken to have waived the right to disclosure of this information. 
I n the High Court, Egan J. thought this point to be of no importance. 126 
Though resting his decision on the premise that the assured did not have 
actual knowledge of his angina, Walsh J. did note in passing in the 
Supreme Court: "It seems to me quite clear that the medical examiner on 
behalf of the iIlsurance company did not follow up all the names given to 
him to the point of ascertaining from them precisely what, if any, 
condition they had discovered."I27 What is surprising is that neither the 
High Court nor the Supreme Court made any reference to Krclillger and 
the principle contained therein. Two notes of caution should however be 
atJpended to the argument that the assured had put the insurer in a 
position to obtain the requisite inll)J"mation. rirst, the name taken clown 
of the specialist in Baggot Street Ilospital was, as noted, Dr. Geraghty as 
opposed to Dr. Gearty. Secondly, in the proposal Il)rm, in reply to the 
question, "Names and Addresses of Doctors attended", a representative 
of the insurance company, on foot of inf(Jrlnation given to him by the 
I I· I . I· . I " " PH II· I I· I assure( or 0 l1S own vo It Ion, answerel none. - ,ex IYPO/ leSI, t le 
insurer could demonstrate that the mistake in Dr. Gearty's name was 
attributable to the assured, and, that the answer in the proposallllrll1 was 
not given on the basis of a medical examination that was to follow, then 
it may have been open to the insurer to claim that it was not in a position 
to take the further step, and so could not be held to have waived the right 
to disclosure of that information. 
Indeed, if it could have been established by the insurer that it had not 
waived the right to disclosure in the proposal Il)J"Ill (this whole issue is 
rather veiled in the judgments), it could have been argued thal the 
answer "nolle" to the question of what doctors had been attended 
I ~h "It would not have mattered, in my opInIon, that the company could have 
.lSll'rt.linl·d the true position if they had sought in/'lrIllation (with James 
Ke.lting's consent) frolll either Ilr. Kidney [the ,Issured's C.P.J or Dr. (;carty as 
is ortcn dOlle ill such cases." II ')')0 I 2 I.IC 3H:l at 3H5-" 3H6. 
I ~7 I/Iid at .lH7. 
I ~H It is IlIlt cicar if the questioll was answered ill this way because a medical 
t'X.lll1inatioll h.ld been arranged by the insurers, with the erfect that no answer 
to this question lVas required by the insurer. 
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purported to be true alld complete (the assured warranted as much). 
Once it was established to be untrue, a material non-disclosure, or at the 
very least a breach of warranty, occurred. Apropos of which, a close 
reading of the text of Egan J.'s judgment in the High Court appears to 
indicate that the questions in the proposal form were answered by the 
representative of the insurer "on foot of information given to him by the 
plaintiff and the deceased husband"129 as opposed to of his own volition, 
and, for whatever reasons (a view taken by McCarthy J. and Walsh J. in 
the Supreme Court). It could also have been argued that the assured did 
not discharge the cOl11mon law obligation of disclosure or, needless to 
. f I I "'1 . I LlO say, satls y t 1e warranty )y answering a Sl1111 ar questIOn correct y' at a 
subsequent medical examination. In this regard, it is surprising that the 
representative of the insurance company was not called to give what 
would appear to have been crucial evidence as to his reasons Il)r writing 
"none" in response to the aforementioned question in the proposal 
form. Though speculative, it may be an indication of the willingness of 
the insurer to concede to waiver of questions in the proposal form. This 
bilure to testify, however, does not explain Egan J.'s finding in the High 
Court that the answers were written on foot of information given by the 
assured and his wife; nor does it adequately explain the Supreme Court's 
alternative finding that the answers were written autonomously of the 
assured's information. It also begs certain other questions: was the 
insurance representative, for example, of sufficient authority to be 
actually or ostensibly authorised to waive disclosure? 13 I I low was KClltillg 
to be distinguished from 'Fl1ylor v. Yorkshire IllSlIrtlllCe Compllll), - as 
adopted by the Supreme Court in FIlrrelll.12 - where it was provided that 
129 11990 J 2 I.It 383 at 385. 
l.lO It was not strictly speaking the sallie question: "what is the nallle and address of 
your present I medical I attendant"? 
131 In Fnghlnd and Wales, see Arterilll Carl/VI/liS v. Yorkshire [IISlInIIICe 11973J I 
Lloyd's Rep. 169. 
1.l2 Johll H. Fllrrcll v. Smllh Emt LlI/CIIsllirc !lIslIrt/llce COII/PIIIIY Ltd. 11933 J I.R. 36. 
Kennedy C.l stated: "The linsurance clerk) filled in the blanks for particulars in 
the proposal forlll, acting in a friendly way on behalf of Ithe assured), in the 
character of a mere amanuensis writing in to the best of his ability the 
particulars from the information given him by the [assuredJ ... But the assured 
chose to trust hi 111 with the doing of the task, and, adopting it as his own,.signed 
it, vouching the truth of the matters stated. Is there any doctrine or principle of 
law which compels the Court in /;Ice of that state of facts to hold as a Illatter of 
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in filling lip answers in a proposal form, the agent of an insurer was taken 
to be the assured's agent and the assured was bound by the declaration he 
signed as if he read it and knew the answers it contained? As Palles CIt 
noted: "The agent of an insurance company cannot be treated as their 
agent to invent the answers to the questions in the proposal form: and 
that, if he is allowed by the proposer to invent the answers and to send 
them as the answers of the proposer, the agent is, to that extent, the agent 
not of the insurance company, but of the proposer." 133 c;iven the dearth 
of case-law on the duty of disclosure in Ireland, it is submitted that it was 
unfortunate that the opportunity was passed over in Keatillg to ruminate 
over the isslIes as set out. 
Returning to the issues in hand, it has been suggested in respect of 
what the assured can assume to be within the knowledge of the insurer 
that the underwriter is presumed to know the usages of the particular 
trade ~ provided it is a known and established trade where usage would 
generally be known to all engaged in the trade ~ insured and these, 
accordingly, need not be represented to the uIlderwriter. 134 In teell v. 
J-/illl u5a castle ill Ballyheigue, Co. Kerry, was insured against damage 
from risks, civil commotion, war, rebellioIl and lIre. The castle was 
destroyed by lIre on the night of May 27, 1921 by insurrectionists during 
law that [the insurance clerk I was the agent of the [insurancel Company ... The 
opinion of l'alles CII. in Tay/or l'. Yorkshire [/ISI/Wllce COIIIPIlIlY will be accl'pted 
as stating the law on this matler as regards agenls of insurance companies in Ihis 
counlry and I rcspeclfully adOI'I it." [/lid al 44. 
1:>3 [I,) 131 2 I.It I al 17. Though Ihe lilels in Kelltillg arose beliJre ils enaclnH.·nl, 
scclinn 51 (I) of Ill<' Insurance Act, 1')8'), amends Ihe law in this area 10 Ihe 
effect thaI an insurance agcnt shall be deemed 10 be acting as Ihe agenl li)r Ihe 
insurer when he or she helps a proposer to contemplate a proposal IlH' 
insurance. Seclion 51 (,I) provides, howevcr, Ihat an insurancc agcnt willnol be 
responsible for any tidse slatements supplied 10 him by Ihe proposer of an 
In,\Ir,lIlCe polic), lJr any inltmnalion wilhheld by the proposcr from such an 
agent. 
1.\·[ "Thus in lllolor insurance an assured who owns a very hlsl I1lolorcar of a 
parlicul,lr make need do no lllorc Ihan declare Ihe usual descriplioIl of Ihe 
v,",lille, hul if he has altered Ihe specificalion in any way so as 10 increase Ihe 
speed Ih,ll, il is ,uhmilled, should be disclosed." See /'vI1/C(;illivmy 01'. cit. n. 51 
,II 1'. ·[21. See a!so Soci,'le AllollYllle d'illterlllediaries v. Fau'x (;ie [ 1')95 [ 2 Lloyd's 
I{ep. IICl ,II 156 per S,lville 1..). Sec also Killgscroji [/ISIIrtIllCe COllIpllllY Ud. Alld 
otl"." I'. n,e Nissilll I:ire Illld l'v[arille IIlSllrilllCe COlIIplillY Ud. [I ')')') 1 Lloyd's 
Rl·p. 601. 
1.1') [1')2.1[ 16 I IL I{ep. 100. 
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the \Var of Independence. In an action on the policy, the insurer ple<lded 
that the assured illter alill had not disclosed that the castle had been 
occupied by the Auxiliaries and employed for the internment of Sinn 
Fein prisoners. The jury found that it was not necessary to disclose these 
facts since underwriters had been effecting sllch types of insurance in 
Ireland since November 1920; accordingly, underwriters mllst have 
known that premises of the kind in question might probably h<lve been 
occupied by the crown forces or employed for the internment of Sinn 
Fein prisoners. 
One should be cautious of the view, however, that an insurer will be 
presumed to have knowledge of mailers simply because he or she had the 
means of ascertaining such knowledge by appropriate enquiry. In nates v. 
Hewill, for example, a vessel of war, the Ge01-gin, obtained notoriety in 
1863-64 as a cruiser in the service of the Confederate states. In May 1864, 
the vessel was dismantled in Liverpool port -- also a mailer of public 
notoriety - and was purchased by the plaintiff and converted into a 
merchant vessel. The defendant insurer was aware that the Georgia had 
been a Confederate vessel of war and that it had been purchased at 
Liverpool and fitted out i(lr merchant service. In August, 1864, the 
plaintiff, through his broker, effected a marine insurance policy on the 
Georgia SS. The defendant insurer underwrote the risk, having {(lrgollen 
that the vessel was previously a Confederate steamer. The vessel sailed 
from Liverpool on August 8, and was captured by a frigate of the United 
States on August 15. The defendant insurer repudiated liability on the 
basis that the assured had f~liled to disclose that the Georgiil SS was 
previously in Confederate service, and was therefore liable to capture by 
the United States. In holding it)!' the insurer, Cockburn c.J. noted: 
I think that we would be sanctioning an encroachment on a most 
important principle, and one that is vital in keeping up the full and 
perfect f:lith which there ought to be in contracts of marine insurance, 
if we were to hold that a party - who is under an obligation to 
communicate the material conditions and facts which constitute the 
basis of the contract into which he invites another to enter - may 
speculate as to what mayor may not be in the mind of the 
underwriter, or as to what mayor may not be brought up to his mind 
by the particulars disclosed to him by the assured, if those particulars 
fall short of the fact which the assured is bound to communicate. I f we 
were to sanction such a course, especially in these days, when parties 
frequently forget the old rules of mercantile faith and honour which 
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used to distinguish this country from any other, we should be lending 
ourselves to innovations of a dangerous and monstrous character, 
which I think we ought not to dO. 13b 
This decision appears to draw a distinction between knowledge of a trade 
practice, which the insurer will be presumed to know, and knowledge of 
particular facts and events which an insurer will be presumed not to 
know - if forgotten at the time of issuing the policy - on the grounds that 
it would constitute an unwarranted encroachment on the sanctity of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as laid out in Curter 1'. J3oehm. Clarke 
submits, correctly in the author's view, that such a distinction is tenuous 
I d I I I · I" . II I " II? '1·1 . . I am ou )ts W 1et1er It can )e practlca y ma( e . . 11S corngen( um, 
according to Clarke, can he contrasted with the Canadian case of 
Clllladian Illdemnity Co. v. Callildillll Johlls-Milllville Co. Ltc/. us Here, an 
insurer issued a comprehensive liability policy to a manufacturer of 
asbestos. The policy was issued in 1970 and renewed in 1973. Studies had 
been published in 1965, 1968 and 1969, demonstrating the dangers of 
asbestos to health. \:ollowing a claim, the insurer repudiated liability on 
the grounds that Ihe assured /~Iiled 10 disclose material /~lctS. In 
particular, it was claimed that the assured /;liled to bring the relevant 
studies to its attention, especially as they related to the incidence of 
respiratory disorders and the mortality rates of workers in asbestos 
related industries. According to counsel for the insurer, the effects of 
articles 2485 and 2486 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada \39 was to 
Ull (IHIl7) L1~ 2 <2.B. 595 at 606·-607. See also Mellor J. who noted: "I think the 
verdict entered for the defendant Illust stand. I t is of the greatest importance to 
abide by the cardinal rules whilh have prevailed on this suhject since the 
judgment delivered by l.ord Mansfield in the case of Corter v. Hoell/II; and it 
would be l1\ost dangerous as it appears to me, to allow these well estahlished 
rules to be frittered .Iway by the introduction of doubtful equivalents. I cannot 
hdp tlllnking that to en.lble a person proposing an insurance to speculate upon 
the l1\axil1\ulll or Illinimnlll of inlilrmation he is bound to cOllllllunicale, would 
be introducing a lllost d.lllgerous principle into the law of insurance." I/Iid at 
IlOt\. 
1.17 ('1.11 ke "f'. (it n. b5 .It 5HR. 
LlH (1'l'lO) 72 11LI{ (.1 11» 47H (Sup Ct.) 
1.19 Artille 2'1t\5 staled: "The insurer is obliged to represent to the insurer fully and 
1;lirly every blt which shows the nature and the extent of the risk, and which 
11\.1)' prevenl the undertaking of it, or affect the rate of the premium." Article 
2·IHb read: "The insured is not obliged to represent f;lcts known to the insurer 
or which from public character or notoriety he is presumed to know." 
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require a strict full disclosure of all material I~lcts unless they were 
notorious in the sense that they were known to the general populace. 
Relying on emler v. Roeizl1l - which was ciled as a pre codification 
authority that circumscribed the interpretation that could be given to the 
provisions of the Code -- it was submitted on behalf of the insurers that 
notorious facts or events had to come within the realm of natural or 
political perils that were known to all before they could be presumed to 
be known to the insurer. Echoing Hasson, Gonthier J., delivering the 
judgment of the Supreme Court, rejected such a narrow interpretation of 
Cllrter v. Boehm. According to the learned judge, the standard by which 
the notoriety of an undisclosed fact was to be assessed, be it in respect of 
a trade practice or particular acts or events, was that "of the reasonably 
competent underwriter insuring similar risks in the industry covered by 
I I·" I·W () I I' C' h' J I I I "I' I' t Ie po ICY . n t le acts, ,ont IeI' . suggestet t lat Ie otlllt 11 
difJicu!t to believe that a reasonably competent insurer in the asbestos 
industry in 1970 would not have been aware of the type of risks alluded 
to in the [studies]".141 The assured, accordingly, was entitled to aSSUllle 
that the insurer had a basic professional knowledge of the risk covered. 
On the basis that it is only of persuasive authority, the nebulous 
distinction made in Bates - and the narrow interpretation accorded 
therein to Lord MansfIeld's dictulll in Carter v. Boehlll - should be 
rejected in Ireland. The more synthesized view, as outlined in Clllladiall 
Indelllnity Co., of practices of the trade context in which the insurer 
operates, together with notoriolls events and acts which affect such trade 
practices, provides, it is submitted, a better juristic symmetry in respect 
of presumed knowledge as it applies to insurers. Though such a position 
does represent an intrusion into the doctrine of utmost good faith, it is 
not unwarranted given that it is in keeping with a wide, and indeed more 
emendated, interpretation of Carler v. Boehm. Nor does the inclusion of 
events and acts within the penumbra of presumed knowledge provide a 
carte /,Iilllche for assureds to assume knowledge on the part of 
underwriters. As Gonthier J. noted: "The insurer will not be presumed 
always to know a fixed level of information regarding any and all 
industries which it might insure. The insurer will be presumed to know 
only those facts which are publicly available and which would be 
140 (1l)l)O) 72 ULR (4Ih) 47H al 506. 
lell Ibid al 512. 
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notorious to the reasonably competent underwriter insuring similar risks 
in lhat industry. It may be that an industry which is relatively new and 
secretive, such as the nuclear industry in the early years of its existence, a 
reasonably competent underwriter would be presumed to know little, 
and the insured will not be entitled to assume that the underwriter knows 
facts which are commonly known in the industry but hidden from those 
outside. As insurers become more f~lIniliar with the industry and as 
information becomes more publicly available, the insured will be able to 
assume that the underwriter is already aware of certain t~lcts which are 
material to the risk, specillcally those lilcts which would be notorious to 
I II ." 14' t le reasona) y competent II1surer. -
Other safeguards also exist. For example, it is well established that the 
presumption of knowledge on the part of the insurer can be rebutted by 
false representations by which he or she is misled.
"
13 Nor will 
information of rumor or conjecture about a {~Ict in question, received 
by an insurer, entitle an assured - who had dellnite knowledge of the filct 
- to argue that the inslII'er knew the t~ICt.'~" Thirdly, an assured cannot 
assume knowledge on the part of an insurer if the undisclosed fact is not 
known generally and, more particularly, it is not something which other 
insurers in the same business would know. '45 Presumably such 
propositions would be adopted by the Irish courts should they arise 
for deliberation. Finally, and in Ireland, it has been held that the 
142 I1,i" at :iOK. 
143 In I\/ilc/.:illtosh till" /)wyer 1', Mtlrsill/ll (IH43) II M and W 116 al 123-125, l.ord 
Abinger e.1l. noted: "lllf no cvidcnce is givcn of anything tending to mislead 
the underIVriler, and the lilcl is slaled in Ihe I Lloyd's llisl, yel he is presumed 10 
be acquainted wilh the bet; bUI wher<: a representalion is made 10 him which is 
not con:,istcnt wilh the Irulh, il is no answer 10 that 10 say liIal he mighl have 
found oul the truth if he had searched Lloyd's list, bccause he Irusls 10 Ihe 
rq1J'est'nlalion," See also Foley v. T(/bor (1861) 2 j: & F (,63 ,II 672. 
1-1-1 Set' l.ill.it'IIIIlI I', U,.:if,orolly,iJ (I il2K) 8 B & C 586 at 5<) I per Lord TenterLicn CJ. 
This Illay, in SOIlle instances, involvc a b,tlancing acl. If such rUlllours Of 
conjcclure nlllid raise in the mind ofa reasonable insurer a suspicion that olher 
cirCuIllstances existed which would or mighl vitiate the presentation made, and 
the altu,1i insurer lilils 10 make furlher enquiries, that illfo[l\\,ltion nwy be 
\\',livl'd by the insurcr. 
1,15 In I/cIlTOIl',., 111111 Others v. /llltchill:iOIl (IK70) LIt 5 Q.B. 584 al 592 Kelly Cil. 
·\06 
Ilolt'd: "It is upon the principle that facts comprised in the gcneral usages of 
I rade Ilt'ed not bc communicated. But in order 10 dispense with communication 
of 'lll)'thing done according to usage, such usage must bc generally and 
ulliversally known to all engaged in the trade." See also lVIllre Rich (11011' (;Iwcore 
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acquIsition of knowledge by an agent of an insurer must occur in the 
ordinary course of duty. I 16 As Palles C.B. noted ill Toylor v. Yorkshire 
1I1SIImllCe C011lPilll), Limited: "\ content myselfhy saying that, as a general 
rule, the notice imputed to the principal is limited to that acquired by the 
agent [of the insurer) whilst he was agent, and acquired in the matter in 
relation to which he was agent.I~7 In a more recent Irish case, as 
discussed, Derlllot Lilt/Will, v. HiiICfIlill1l Insurallce COIll/lOIlY til/lit cd (/lui 
Peter]. Sheridall {//U/ COlllpany Li1Jlited148 the plaintiff obtained a lease 
for 35 years on a premises in Ringsend in Dublin and subsequently 
opened a grocery shop on the ground floor. Insurance cover was 
obtained /i·om the defendant insurers in August 1983 and the policy was 
renewed the following year. Prior to renewal, however, the plaintiff had 
been arrested and charged with receiving stolen goods (the goods in 
question being cigarettes to the value of £'17,(00) on November 22, 19H3 
and had admitted the committal of the ofiences to investigating Gardai. 
This fact had not been disclosed at renewal of the policy and the 
defendant insurer claimed that it was entitled to avoid the policy. Two 
questions arose for consideration in the courl. 14Y First, it was claimed by 
counsel for the plaintiff that the fact that the assured had pleaded guilty 
did not necessarily indicate that he had committed the said offence. This 
Illlerlllltiolllll A(;j lIl/d AI/oilier v. l'orl/llllll llllti Olliers [1997]1 I.ioyd's Rep. 225 
where Leggalt LJ. held thai the previous loss experience of an assured was not 
something of common notoriety or knowledge, and there was nothing about it 
which an insurer in Ihe ordinary course of business, as such, oughl 10 know. 
146 See Tille v. Hyslop (1885) 15 Q.B.I>. 368; Pi/ll/ll v. tcwis (t862) 2 F & F 778. 
147 [1913] I.lt I at 21. See also Cihson J. in the same judglllenl: "In none of the 
cases rdinl on ... where the insmers were held bound by the agent's knowledge, 
was such knowledge acquired otherwise than in discharge of duty in relalion to 
the particular conlracl." Ibid at 33. 
148 Unreported, lIigh COlll't, March 22, 1991. 
149 The LOurt also held a broker to be responsible for not making the need 10 
disclose infilfln,ltion 10 the insurer dear to Ihe assured. For I he assessmenl of 
damages against the broker. see DCI'll/of Lllllillll/ v. IliiJcmio/J IrlSlI1'Ill/CC Co. Ltd 
lllIi/Peler /. Slieritillll lllIti Co. Ltd. Unreporled, High COlll'l, December 4, 1991, 
per Blayney J. Interestingly the issue of contrihulory negligence on Ihe part of 
the assured was never raised by Ihe defcndanl broker. As in England and Wales, 
as per Slillrp 1'. SjJliere V1'Ilke, The MOOIIIJ(TC [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 50 I, it appears 
Ihat contributory negligence as il applies to assureds will only arise in limited 
circumstances. Indeed in Ireland in ChI/riot IlIlIs Kenny J. in the Supreme court 
slaled: "The question of contribulory negligence on the part of ,the plaintiffs 
[Ihe asslJl't'dsj was raised by counsel fill" the brokers bul, underslandably, it was 
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submission was rejected alld Blayney). went on to hold, relying on the 
English court of Appeal case of ReYllolds (llld Allderso/l v. }'1lOellix 
Assurance Co. Ltd (llld Others l50 and the testimony of two experienced 
underwriters, that the fact that a person committed such an offence, and 
had admitted it, "would necessarily influence the mind of a prudent 
insurer" .151 Secondly, counsel for the plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
insurer had knowledge of the relevant fact from two other sources. To 
begin with, it was claimed that an inspector of the defendants had visited 
the shop in January 1984 and had been informed about the plaintiffs 
arrest. The inspector denies this and Blayney J. accepted his testimony. It 
was also claimed by the plaintifCs daughter that at a rehearsal of a show 
in November 1983, an insurance clerk of Hibernian had commiserated 
with her over her f~lther's arrest. 152 The learned judge was not satisfied 
the plaintiffs daughter was a truthful witness. Even, however, if he had 
accepted her evidence, this knowledge would not still have been the 
knowledge of the defendant insurer: 
In my opinion this is clear from the following passage in MacC;illivray 
and Parkington on Insurance Law (iii ecln) paragraph 674: "It is 
obvious that the insurers cannot complain of having been mislead by 
the assured's concealment when from some other source they had 
received knowledge of the facts which they say were not commu-
nicated. This would seem to apply even to fraudulent concealment by 
the assured, since the concealment could not have inllucnced the 
insurer's judgmcnt. This principle applics where knowledge is received 
by an agent of the company, but is subject to the general limitation 
that the agent must have received it in the course of his duty and 
employment. It is clear in the present case that if [the insurance clerk] 
received knowledge of the t~lct that the plaintiff had been arrcsted and 
charged, he did not receive such knowledge in the course of his 
employment but in the course of socializing with his friends. 
not l'r,'sscd. 11,l\'ing gi\'L'n Ihe nt'Lcssary t'lcls in answer to '1lll'stiollS put by Ihe 
brok"r's rcprc"'nl<ltivl' ... tlw plaintiffs (assuredsl Wl're entitkd to rdy on his 
skill ,lnd illdglllCllt; alld so it cOllld llol be held that thl'Y were gllilty of 
Ulntrihlltory nl'gligt"lln~." /19H II !.It 225 at 2.12. 
I C,O /197H I ~ I loyd's Rep. 440. 
lSI llnrcplHll'd, lIigh COllIl, Mardl 22,1991, al p. 6. 
1'i2 111I',IS sllhillillcd Ihal hl'l" hoyfriend had told a group offi'iends oflhe plaintiffs 
.II rcst ,lnd Ihe insllrance llerk was alllongst those he had lold. 
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Knowledge received hy him ill such circumstances coulll not he 
. I I . I "I S \ lInputet to liS emp Dyees. .. 
Though it is not denied that the proposition submitted by MacGillivmy is 
correct as I relates to agents of the insurer, it is surprising that Blayney J. 
choose A1ilcGillivray as authority when he could have relied on the more 
persuasive, though similar, dicta of Palles e.B. and Gibson J. in 'filylo)" v. 
Yorkshire Illsura11ce COlllpill1Y. In doing so, he could have availed of the 
opportunity to opine on the distinction drawn by Gibson J. between 
information received by agents of the insurer and agents of the assured; 
such an enguiry may have been particularly apposite in the light of his 
judgment in the same year in Illtemiltiollal Co III III ercial Balik PLe v. 
Illsurallce Corporotioll of Irelalld Pl.C alld Meadows Indelllnity Co. Ud. 1S4 
In Ireland, there has been little prolonged rellection regarding the law 
on information known or presumed to be known to insurers as provided 
for under section 18(3)(b) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. This 
chasm is attributable, for the most part, to the lack of case law arising in 
this jurisdiction; when opportunities did however present themselves, 
they were often either passed up, or, passed over by reliance on the 
propositions of leading textbook writers in the field. More particularly, 
there has been a failure, specifically in Keatil/g, to tease out the 
proposition in Krelil/ger that a clear intimation of a matter by an assured, 
though not specifically set out, would constitute waiver of that 
infi:lrmation by an insurer in circumstances where he or she failed to 
investigate the mailer further. Moreover, in LIlI/WIIl, Blayney J. slavishly 
adopted the proposition of MacGillivrtly to the effect that any knowledge 
of received by an agent of an insurance company mllst have been 
received in the ordinary course of duty. Though the author does not have 
any diffIculty with this proposition, it is lamentable that the learned 
judge ignored the dicta of Gibson J. and Palles e.B. in the pre-1922 Irish 
decision of Taylor - this oversight resulted in the loss of the chance to 
examine the distinction drawn by Gibson J. in the said case. Indeed this 
laxity as regards T{/y/or is heightened by the fact that so few duty of 
disclosure cases arise for consideration in Ireland. Finally, the 
opportunity has not yet presented itself to the judiciary to consider the 
odious distinction made in Boles between knowledge of a trade practice 
IS:-l Unreported, lIigh Court, March 22, 1991, at p. 9. 
I S4 See oJ>. cif. 11. H4. 
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and particular facts and events. Should it arise, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Irish courts should adopt a line of reasoning more in 
keeping with that posited by Gonthier J. in Cal/ae/iall llltienmity Co. 
CONCLUSION 
In an article written in 1990, the leading writer of insurance law in 
I reland, Professor I !emy Ellis, suggested that stat utory based reform of 
the common law doctrine of uberrillla fides seemed imminent. lss To an 
extent his prophecy has rung true given that the Insurance Act 1989 has 
been brought into force, the European Communities (Unf~lir Terms in 
Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 anel the Life Assurance 
(Provision of Information) Regulations 2001 have been enacted, and 
voluntary Codes of Insurance Practice have been adopted. However, and 
as I have sought to demonstrate in this circumscribed analysis of 
uberrimll fides contracts in Ireland, the need for reform continues to 
remain essential at a number of levels. To begin with, immediate 
attention should be drawn to the whole area of commercial contracts of 
insurance which currently f~dl outside the ambit of the Insurance Codes 
of Practice. Similarly, and given its coercive effects, focus needs to be 
brought to bear on the amorphous grey area of previous criminal 
information as it relates to the duty of disclosure. In this regard it should 
be possible to extend the non-life Insurance Codes of Practice to include 
cOlllmercial as well as consumer assureds (particularly as regards basis of 
contract clauses) to palliate the {tlrlller defect, and to introduce 
expungement provisions to remedy the latter. Such microsurgery could, 
it is submitted, be catered for in the legislative domain given the 
specificities and insularities involved. So much for Charybdis, but what 
of Scylla? 
In examining the duty of disclosure from the narrow perspective of 
what lIeed not he disclosed, a whole array of unsettled and undetermined 
issues have been raised in this article. These include: propositions as 
regards ignorance or obtuseness about material j~JCts; inferences that can 
be drawll fWIll primary knowledge; the test of what ought to be known in 
the llrdillary lourse or busilless; the principal/agent nexus ill the light of 
155 l'llis, II. "/', (il. 11. '16 al pp. 45- 50. 
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sections 18 and 19 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906; the manner in 
which an agent to insure receives information; and the distinction drawn 
between trade practices and events and acts. When coupled with much 
broader principles, that are equally if not more unsettled and 
contentious, which fall for consideration under the rubric of llberri11la 
fides contracts - including the prudent insurer's test of materiality, the 
continuing nature of the duty, the "all or nothing" effects of non-
disclosure, waiver, the insurer's duty of disclosure, and moral hazard -
156 it seems highly unlikely that such a myriad of ambagious issues could 
be catered for within the confines of a single piece of legislation. So how 
then do we circumnavigate Scylla? 
To begin with, one could hold out for the harmonization of the 
substantive law of insurance contracts within the European Union. 1S? 
This is unlikely, however, to happen anytime soon given the cautious and 
piecemeal nature of convergence between European legal systems to-
date. As Lord Goff recently noted in England: "Of course there will be 
some! who believe 1 that uniformity of our private law across Europe is in 
itself a desirable objective ... It is not indeed beyond the bounds of 
possibility that such a development will occm one day; but I believe that 
if the members of this school rush their fences, this will prove to be 
counter-productive. Uniformity as an end in itself is an ideal which is not 
shared by all. It must not be forgotten that in the United States which is, 
as we know, a federal state, variations in the private laws of 50 states of 
the Union are tolerated, the most notable example being the laws of the 
State of Louisiana which have their origins in the civil law. The American 
Law Institute's Restatement of the Law is designed to do no more than 
influence the states to move in the direction of a more unilled 
system." ISH Perhaps, and though not intended, the answer (or at least an 
avenue of enquiry) lies in the quote, particularly as it relates to 
restatements. It is respectfully submitted that reform of the duty of 
ISo See Kiicoml11ins, S. and Lind, C. 01'. cit. n. 5. at Pl'. 263-278; O'Regan Cazabon, 
A. "Insurance Law in Ireland," Sweet and Maxwell: Dublin 1999. pp. 44-53; 
(;reent()rd, H.C. Non-disclosure in Ireland. [mllrallcc [.tIIl' IIlId Pmctice 4 (1994): 
pp. 39--42; Corrigan, M. and Call1phdl, I.A. "A Casebook of Irish Insurance 
Law," Oak Tree Press, Dublin, 1995: pp. 230·-284. 
157 See Basedow, J. The case for a European insurance contract code. jOllrJw/ of 
Illlsilless La1\', November, (20() I): 569-S80. . 
158 Lord (;off. oJ>. cit. n. 4. at pp. 239-249. 
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disclosure in Ireland, aside from the legislative changes posited, should 
be by way of a set of unoffICial, non-binding rules ~ to be drawn up by a 
working group of academics, legal practitioners, underwriters, and 
consumer and commercial representatives ~ in the tiJrm of model laws or 
restatements. Such restatements or models, which could be accompanied 
and supported by comments and comparative notes, would operate by 
consensus and not coercion. In tabulating the various propositions of 
law, the working group could look to, and draw upon, the templates of 
others including the Lando Commission on Principles of European 
Contract Law 15<J and the Working Croup which has been established on 
European insurance Contract Law, the aim of which is to work out 
"common principles of European insurance contract law, relying on 
comparative studies of the national laws of EU member states, SOIlle 
member states of the European Economic area and Switzerland".160 
These restatements or model laws on uberri/lla _(zdes, when formulated, 
could be adopted by the Irish Insurance Federation or by contracting 
parties as the basis of their transactions. Of course, reform of this nature 
is not without problems. Restatements undoubtedly would require 
extensive research and compromise to agree propositions of law; nor can 
it be guaranteed that they would meet with widespread approval or 
compliance. Nonetheless, and as Professor Clarke has stated: "Model 
laws and restatements, in both their development and their function are 
without many of the disadvantages of compulsory codes. They also lack 
teeth. They neither bark nor hite, but their function is not to chivvy or 
direct the flock ... into any particular linc. Their role is to inform and be 
available ~ available for voluntary adoption by those who find them 
useful." 161 On the basis of the maxim that half a loaf is better than no 
bread, any vehicle of reform of the duty of disclosure, which is instructive 
and accesible, must be welcomed in Ireland. 
I 59 Sl'C II I '1':/ /t"\\'\\'.t1,,_dUdc/hl rllllclltslltlll'/slllff/ol/cOIlllllissioll_oll .['c/llIlclll/n'r>. hI III 
I (,0 See IIII!'://t,'\VII', lIi/l/.:.tlC,tlllc/c3kJOSlresllllclIlcllllportll/,hlllll 
I()I Cl.llkl" 1\\. \loubts frolll the dark side - The case against codes. jOllriliJ! of 
flIlS;II[,SS LII,'. November, (200 I): 605--6 t 5. 
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